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Observation-Based Modeling for Testing and
Verifying Highly Dependable Systems – A
Practitioner’s Approach
Teemu Kanstre´n1, Eric Piel2, Alberto Gonzalez2, and Hans-Gerhard Gross2
1 VTT, Kaitova´yla´ 1, Oulu, Finland
teemu.kanstren@vtt.fi
2 Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD Delft
{e.a.b.piel,a.gonzalezsanchez,h.g.gross}@tudelft.nl
Abstract. Model-based testing (MBT) can reduce the cost of making
test cases for critical applications signiﬁcantly. Depending on the formal-
ity of the models, they can also be used for veriﬁcation. Once the models
are available model-based test case generation and veriﬁcation can be
seen as “push-button solutions.” However, making the models is often
perceived by practitioners as being extremely diﬃcult, error prone, and
overall daunting.
This paper outlines an approach for generating models out of observa-
tions gathered while a system is operating. After reﬁning the models with
moderate eﬀort, they can be used for veriﬁcation and test case genera-
tion. The approach is illustrated with a concrete system from the safety
and security domain.
1 Introduction
Testing consumes a large portion of the overall development cost for a software
project. Because testing adds nothing in terms of functionality to the software,
there is a strong incentive towards test automation with Model-Based Testing
(MBT). Once the models are made and appropriate tools are available, MBT is
a push-button solution. Making the models of the System Under Test (SUT),
to be used for automated processing and test case generation, does not add any
immediate auxiliary value to the ﬁnal product as well. Moreover, it is typically
perceived by practitioners as being diﬃcult, expensive, and overall daunting. One
solution for circumventing the diﬃcult and costly manual design and construc-
tion process to obtain models for MBT is to generate them out of observations
automatically [5], e.g., with the aid of a process mining technique [9].
Obviously, this method of observation-based modeling has to be “boot-
strapped” and, therefore, works only on existing software with existing runtime
scenarios, e.g., ﬁeld data and existing test suites [2]. Because most typical soft-
ware projects in practice have test suites, Observation-Based Modeling (OBM)
can be adopted easily by practitioners, and can, eventually, oﬀer automated sup-
port for constructing system speciﬁcation models to be used for system testing
following system evolution.
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This article presents and outlines a method for model-based testing driven
by observation-based modeling. The method is supported by a compilation of
existing techniques and tools that have been combined and integrated in order to
devise a practical, iterative and (semi-) automatic way to support the creation of
behavioural models out of execution traces (observations). The models are made
speciﬁcally for model-based testing, and they are applied to test and verify a
component of a maritime safety and security system. Evaluation of the proposed
approach indicates that system speciﬁcation models for a security system can be
boot-strapped from existing execution scenarios, and that they can be reﬁned
into models suitable for MBT with relatively little manual user involvement.
The paper is structured as follows. Sect. 2 presents work related, Sect. 3 de-
scribes our proposed approach of model-generation, veriﬁcation, reﬁnement, and
testing. Sect. 4 presents evaluation of the work, and ﬁnally, Sect. 5 summarizes
and concludes the paper with future directions.
2 Background and Related Work
OBM demands that (test) executions of the system under test can be observed,
also referred to as tracing. Tracing is widely used in dynamic analysis of programs
and it can be applied to observe which components, methods, or basic building
blocks are invoked during execution, in order to turn this information into a
behavioural model of the software [2]. In addition, external tracing mechanisms
such as aspects [6] provide the advantage that the source code does not have to
be amended for supporting the tracing.
Finite State Machines (FSM) and Extended FSM (EFSM) are of particular
interest for behavioural modeling and, consequently, for behavioural testing [8].
They describe the system in terms of control states and transitions between
those states. EFSM add guard conditions to the more general FSM.
Bertolino et al. [1] proposed three steps to the automated “reverse-
engineering” of models to be used for model-based testing, but they never real-
ized their proposition. Our method outlined here takes their ideas further and
discusses a concrete implementation with existing tools. Ducasse et al. [4] use
queries on execution traces to test a system. In this article, we apply similar
techniques to help understand what a system does, and to test it. D’Amorim
et al. [3] apply symbolic execution and random sequence generation for iden-
tifying method invocation sequences of a running system. They devise the test
oracle from exceptions and from monitoring executions violating the system’s op-
erational proﬁle, described through an invariant model. Our proposed method
follows their approach of generating the test oracle. Lorenzoli et al. [7] present a
way to generate EFSM from execution traces, based on FSM and Daikon3. They
use the EFSM for test case selection in order to build an optimal test suite.
3 http://groups.csail.mit.edu/pag/daikon
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3 Observation-Based Modeling
Observation-Based Modeling turns the traditional MBT approach around as
described in [1]. Instead of creating a model manually, based on a (non-formal)
speciﬁcation, the model is created from the implementation, based on executing
a limited number of initial test cases, and tracing their executions. OBM can be
used to generate the test model for MBT, the test harness, and the test oracle,
by monitoring the SUT’s input and output during a selected set of execution
scenarios. The entire process can be divided in four diﬀerent activities, as detailed
below.
3.1 Capturing a set of observations
The ﬁrst step in OBM is to capture a suitable set of observations to be used as a
basis for the initial model generation. To obtain observations, the SUT behaviour
is monitored while exercising it using a set of existing execution scenarios, such
as existing test cases, recorded user sessions, or ﬁeld data [2].
The main information required to be captured are the messages passed
through the input- and output-interfaces of the SUT, and the SUT internal
state each time a message is passed. Typical component middlewares allow to
list the component interfaces and to capture all component interactions, with-
out having to instrument every component individually. Obtaining the internal
state might be harder, as our approach strives to be compatible with black-box
components. Accessing this information typically requires an additional test in-
terface or serialization interface designed into the SUT. In case this is lacking,
either the SUT must be manually extended, or it could be possible to maintain
an “artiﬁcial” state out of the inputs and outputs.
3.2 Automatic generation of the model
The second activity consists in processing those traces and generating an initial
behavioural model. This model, expressed as an EFSM, requires the production
of states, transitions, and guards.
The generation of the initial EFSM comprises four phases. First, the static
parts of the model are generated. These parts are similar for all generated models,
and the provided SUT interface deﬁnitions are the variables used as input in
this phase. Second, an FSM is generated which describes the SUT in terms of
interface usage, where each message passed through one of the interfaces matches
a state in the FSM. This is done via the ProM tool [9]. This FSM is analysed
and processed with speciﬁc algorithms to capture the interactions (states and
transitions) for the EFSM. Third, invariants over the SUT internal state and
parameter data values are provided, and then used to generate constraints, i.e.,
transition guards, for the interactions and for the processed data values (input
data). Finally, all these separate parts of the model are combined to produce
the complete EFSM. Fig. 1 presents a very simple example of EFSM speciﬁed in
the same way as a model generated by our tool. The current state of the model
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is reported by one special method getState(). Every transition is described by
one method (e.g.: vend()) plus an associated method describing its guard (e.g.:
vendGuard()).
public class VendingMachineModel implements FsmModel {
private int money = 0;
public Object getState () { return money; }
public void reset(boolean b) { money = 0; }
@Action public void vend() {money = 0;}
public boolean vendGuard () {return money == 100;}
@Action public void coin25 () {money += 25;}
public boolean coin25Guard () {return money <= 75;}
@Action public void coin50 () {money += 50;}
public boolean coin50Guard () {return money <= 50;}
}


 

	








Fig. 1. Example EFSM of a vending machine.
3.3 Test execution
In order to generate the test cases out of the EFSM, our approach relies on
ModelJUnit4. A test case is created for every possible path going through the
various states, along the transitions. Let us note that in this type of model, the
lack of some states or transitions compared to the “perfect” model signiﬁes only
that the modeled behaviour is not complete, but still represents only allowed
behaviour. It is therefore possible to run the test execution before the model is
ﬁnalized.
In our approach, each transitions contains code to actually send and listen
messages from the SUT. Each transition also contains JUnit5 assertions to de-
termine if the correct messages were answered. The triggering of an assertion
implies failure of the test case. The test case is considered passed if no assertion
was triggered during the entire execution of the path.
3.4 Manual reﬁnement
The fourth activity for the MBT consists in manual improvement of the gener-
ated EFSM. It is typically performed in parallel to the test execution activity.
4 http://czt.sourceforge.net/modeljunit
5 http://www.junit.org
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In addition to deﬁning the initialization of the complex variables, the task of
the engineer is to reﬁne and generalize the EFSM to match the generic expected
behaviour of the SUT, which might be diﬀerent from the observed behaviour.
This manual activity should be done in little gradual steps, guided by the results
of the tests which exercise the new paths introduced by the generalization of the
model at the precedent step.
4 Case study
An example SUT called Merger is used to illustrate the techniques. It is part
of a maritime surveillance system. It receives information broadcasts from ships
called AIS messages and processes them in order to form a situational picture
of the coastal waters. The Merger acts as temporary database for AIS messages,
and client components can consult it for track information of ships, or receive
notiﬁcations of certain ship events. The SUT is also used by software controlling
the main screen in the command and control centre for displaying ship tracks.
The system comes with a speciﬁcation in plain English deﬁning behaviour and
communication protocols of its components. The components are implemented
in Java, executed under the Fractal component framework6.
4.1 Qualitative evaluation
The Merger component was ﬁrst instrumented to allow observing a few vari-
ables representing its global state and the method calls. Then, observation of
the component was performed while 6 manually written unit tests were run and
during ﬁve minutes of normal operation with ﬁeld input data. An EFSM was
generated out of the traces. This model was manually reﬁned (470 lines of code
were changed over 1700) mainly by deﬁning initialization code, generalizing the
guards, and correcting the expected behaviour depending on the speciﬁcation.
The reﬁnement process took place with feedback from the generated tests which
gradually tested more behaviour of the component. When a bug in the Merger
component was found, it was immediately ﬁxed and the reﬁnement process re-
sumed. The reﬁnement and testing process was ﬁnished when all the states were
accessed, and none of the generated test cases failed.
During this process several errors were found. These errors can be classiﬁed
into three main types: mismatches between implementation and speciﬁcation
(3), ambiguities in the speciﬁcation (1), and problems in the design that cause
errors under certain conditions speciﬁc to the testing environment (2). Overall,
in terms of identifying previously unknown errors of a component that had been
used for some time in this context, this can be regarded as a very successful
model-based testing experiment with real value to the quality of the system.
The evaluation of the method presented, performed in the Merger case study,
indicates that the models generated can be used well for model-based testing
after moderate manual amendments.
6 http://fractal.ow2.org
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4.2 Quantitative evaluation
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency of the approach, two quantitative evaluations
have been also performed. First, using the source code of the Merger component,
the coverage of the generated tests has been measured. The measurements are
shown in Table 1. Here, Unit tests refer to the six initial unit tests used as
execution scenarios. EFSM refers to the tests generated by the MBT tool out
of the ﬁnal reﬁned model. The four columns correspond to four diﬀerent types
of coverage: statement, method, conditional, and path coverage. This latter one
is the number of unique paths in the ﬁnal EFSM which were followed during a
test.
Source Statements Methods Conditionals Paths
Unit tests 53.5% 64.5% 38.7% 6
EFSM 64.1% 67.7% 48.4% 87
EFSM + Unit tests 65.5% 67.7% 51.6% 92
Table 1. SUT coverage breakdown by execution scenarios.
It is visible that the tests generated from the model provide a signiﬁcant
increase in coverage over the used unit tests. The EFSM set outperformed the
initial tests by a small percentage due to observation of the system also on ﬁeld
data, as well as due to the generalization of the generated model in the veri-
ﬁcation and testing reﬁnement phase. This generalization permitted execution
of additional parts of the code, while most parts executed by the original tests
are still executed. The biggest diﬀerence is in the Paths metric. EFSM largely
outperforms the initial tests. Nevertheless this is what is to be expected from an
MBT tool that is intended to generate complex interactions to test the SUT.
Second, mutation testing was used to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the gen-
erated test suite. Mutation testing consists in introducing a modiﬁcation in the
code of SUT, and to check whether a test suite is able to detect this “mutation”.
117 “mutants” were automatically generated, of which 51 were considered se-
mantically equivalent after manual inspection. The results are shown in Table 2.
When a test ﬁnds no errors (the SUT is considered to operate ﬁne), the result is
termed “positive”, and oppositely, when an error is reported, it is termed “nega-
tive”. “False positives” are the mutations reported ﬁne although it was manually
veriﬁed that they behave outside of the speciﬁcation sometimes. “False negative”
would be a case where a correct SUT is classiﬁed as having an error.
Source True positive False positive True negative False negative Total
Unit tests 51 16 50 0 117
EFSM 51 15 51 0 117
Table 2. Mutation test results.
The ﬁnal model provides minimal gain over the initial unit tests. The model
outperforms the unit tests in correct categorization of mutants with actual modi-
ﬁed behaviour only by a slight margin. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that the
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correct categorizations done by the EFSM are a superset of the one performed by
the unit tests. The generated model could detect all the bugs originally detected
by the units tests and more.
5 Conclusions
Dependable systems need a high quality of engineering in order to ensure the
stability and the correct behaviour of the implementation. Models are useful
assets for system engineering. They can be used for speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation,
reasoning, and test case generation. Once models are available, powerful tools
and techniques can be applied to support a range of activities. However, making
the models is still perceived by practitioners as being diﬃcult, costly, and error
prone. A way to circumvent the diﬃcult modeling process is to have speciﬁcation
models derived automatically from observations from a running system. Because
such models specify observed behaviour, rather than expected behaviour, they
have to be amended, in order to be applied, eventually, for veriﬁcation and test
case generation.
This paper has presented a approach to bootstrap, reﬁne, and verify models
from execution traces, to be used primarily for model-based testing.
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Safety Recommendations for Safety-Critical
Design Patterns
Ashraf Armoush and Stefan Kowalewski
Embedded Software Laboratory
RWTH Aachen University
Aachen, Germany
{armoush, kowalewski}@embedded.rwth-aachen.de
Abstract. The concept of design patterns, which is considered as one
of the commonly used techniques in the development of software and
hardware systems, is applicable to be used in the design of safety-critical
embedded systems. While several safety metrics and assessment meth-
ods have been proposed to evaluate safety-critical systems, most of these
methods cannot be used for safety-critical design patterns, due to the
fact that a design pattern presents a high-level abstract solution to com-
monly recurring design problem and it is not related to a specific ap-
plication or to a specific case. This paper proposes a system of safety
recommendations for safety-critical design patterns, which can be used
in the assessment of design patterns for safety-critical embedded systems
to reflect the severity of failure in the target application. The proposed
safety recommendations are based on the safety recommendations of the
IEC 61508 standard, and contain additional 3 types of recommendations:
weakly not recommend, weakly recommended, and moderately recom-
mended.
Key words: Safety-Critical, Design Patterns, Safety Recommendations
1 Introduction
With the increasing use of the concept of design patterns as a universal ap-
proach to describe common solutions to widely recurring design problems in
software and hardware domain, it has become a good candidate for the design of
safety-critical embedded systems. In general, the safety-critical systems address
the applications in which failure can lead to serious injury, significant prop-
erty damage, or damage to the environment [1, 2]. The design of these systems
should fulfill the intended functional requirements (FR) as well as non-functional
requirements that define qualities of a system such as: safety, reliability, and ex-
ecution time.
System safety represents the main non-functional requirement for safety-
critical embedded system. It is defined by MIL-STD-882D standard [3] as “Free-
dom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness,
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment”.
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Therefore, many design techniques, concepts, safety methods, metrics and stan-
dards have been proposed and used to cover the development lifecycle and to
improve the non-functional requirements of such safety-critical systems.
While the commonly used standards give recommendations for safety design
techniques, none of these standards gives recommendations at the level of de-
sign patterns. In most situations, design patterns present abstract solutions that
combine more than single safety technique and design method to solve some
common design problems. Therefore, a system of recommendations should be
used for safety-critical design patterns to facilitate the comparison process and
safety assessment for these patterns.
In this paper, we propose a systematic method to find safety recommenda-
tions for safety-critical design patterns. This method is based on the recommen-
dations proposed by IEC 61508 standard [4] for safety techniques. The proposed
safety recommendations, which reflect the importance of the addressed design
pattern and severity of target applications, can be used later as a part of a safety
assessment method for design patterns.
2 The Concept of Design Patterns
The idea of design patterns was original proposed by the architect “Christopher
Alexander” [5], then it became one of the widely used techniques to support
designers and system architects in their choice of suitable solutions for commonly
recurring design problems.
While this concept has been applied in several application domains of hard-
ware and software design (see e.g. [6][7]), further research is still needed to adapt
this concept for the field of safety-critical embedded systems. The design of
these systems is considered to be a complex process, since there are many non-
functional requirements, mainly safety, that have to be fulfilled by these systems
to assure that the risk of hazards is acceptable low.
Due to the fact that the current representations of design patterns lack a con-
sideration of potential side effects on non-functional requirements, we proposed
in a previous paper [8] a pattern representation template for safety-critical em-
bedded application design methods. This representation includes the traditional
pattern concept in combination with an extension describing the implications
and side effects of the represented design method on the non-functional require-
ments of the overall system.
In order to facilitate the safety comparison process between the design pat-
terns under consideration, a system of safety recommendations for safety-critical
design patterns should be constructed. Later, these recommendations can be
used in a safety assessment method for safety-critical design patterns.
3 Safety Standards and Risk Metric
In the design of safety-critical embedded systems, specific aspects, requirements,
techniques, and safety management have to be considered. Thus, many safety
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Safety Recommendations for Safety-Critical Design Patterns 3
standards have been proposed to cover the safety management of safety-critical
systems throughout their lifecycles. Some of the important and commonly used
standards are: MIL-STD-882D [3] which is a military standard, and IEC 61508 [4]
which is a well-known application-independent standard.
Most of the time, system safety is related to the risk of failure in a system and
the techniques that should be used to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. The
safety assessment of safety-critical systems requires the use of a specific safety
and risk metric. Thus, many metrics, such as Steady-State Safety (SSS) and
Mean Time to Unsafe Failure (MTTUF ) (see e.g. [9][10]), have been proposed
to be used in the assessment of safety-critical systems. Nevertheless, the risk,
which is defined in the standard IEC 61508 as a combination of the probability
of occurrence of harm1 and the severity of that harm, is considered as the most
generic metric that deals with a wide range of applications. The risk metric is
based on the following equation:
R = C × f (1)
− R: the risk in the system.
− C: the consequence of the hazardous event2.
− f : the frequency of the hazardous event.
The aim of our research is to construct a catalog of safety-critical design
patterns, and to develop a safety metric similar to the metric in Equation 1.
This metric will be used as a safety and risk metric for the assessments of these
patterns and to give an indication about the implication and side-effects of safety-
critical design patterns on system safety.
3.1 Limitations:
A design pattern represents a high level abstract solution to a commonly recur-
ring design problem. It is not related to a specific application or to a specific
case; thus, it is very difficult to find an actual value for both the frequency of
the hazardous event (f ) and the consequence of the hazardous event (C ).
In order to find parameters for our metric similar to the parameters used in
the original risk metric shown in Equation 1, we have proposed in a previous
paper [11] a metric that reflects the idea of frequency of hazardous event.(see
Section 5 ). Furthermore, to cover the other part, we propose in the next section
a method that gives an indication about the severity of the hazardous event
similar to the first factor.
4 Applicability to Safety Integrity Levels
The IEC61508, which is the most commonly-used standard in industrial applica-
tions, defined the term safety integrity as “probability of a safety-related system
1 Harm: physical injury or damage to the health of people either directly or indirectly
as a result of damage to property or to the environment [4].
2 Hazardous Event: a situation which results in harm [4].
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satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated con-
ditions within a stated period of time”. Part 4 of the standard defines 4 discrete
levels for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be
allocated to the system. These levels range from safety integrity level 1 (SIL1) to
safety integrity level 4 (SIL4) where safety integrity level 4 denotes the highest
level of safety integrity.
The IEC61508 standard introduces recommendations for techniques and
measures to be applied in order to avoid safety-critial failures caused by hard-
ware or software. These recommendations are dependent on the safety integrity
levels and are classified according to their importance into 4 types:
* HR: The technique is highly recommended for this safety integrity level.
* R: The technique is recommended for this safety integrity level
* –: The technique has no recommendation for or against used.
* NR: The technique is positively not recommended for this safety integrity
level.
You have to keep in mind that the use of these recommended techniques
does not give any guarantee that the final design will satisfy the required safety
integrity level. However, in order to get a certificate for a specific safety integrity
level, the standard should be used in the complete lifecycle of the design process.
While a safety integrity level is derived from an assessment of risk, it is not
a measure of risk [12]. The safety integrity level will be used in the first com-
ponent of our approach as an indication of severity of failures in the considered
application after using a specific design pattern. The applications, that require
high safety integrity levels, include higher severity than the applications with
lower integrity levels. Thus, the intended safety integrity level for a system can
be used as an indication of the possible severity and consequence of a hazardous
event in that system.
Though the IEC61508 introduces recommendations for techniques and mea-
sures to avoid safety-critical failures caused by hardware or software, these rec-
ommendations are derived from safety integrity levels and given for different
design techniques but not for general design patterns or architectures. Normally,
a design pattern combines more than one architecture technique to improve the
system safety. Therefore, we introduce a systematic method to give general safety
recommendations at the level of design patterns.
Table 1. Safety recommendations in IEC 61508
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To find the recommendations of importance for a specific pattern for the
safety integrity levels, integer equivalent values are assigned to the recommen-
dations as shown in Table 1. Then the average value of the existing techniques
is calculated for each safety integrity level.
The resulting average value may range between two integer numbers which
makes the selection of the suitable recommendation more difficult. To solve this
problem, we introduce a new system of recommendations for design patterns.
These recommendations contain additional 3 types: weakly not recommend,
weakly recommended, and moderately recommended. The new recommendation
types are classified based on the average value as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Proposed system of recommendations for design patterns
4.1 Example
The Safety Executive Pattern (SEP) [13], which is a large scale pattern used
to provide a centralized and consistent method for monitoring and controlling
the execution of a complex procedure in case of failures, includes the following
design techniques: program sequence monitoring by a watchdog, test by redundant
hardware, safety bag techniques, and graceful degradation. According to the IEC
61508 standard, the recommendations for these techniques are shown Table 3.
Table 3. Safety recommendations of the used techniques in SEP
Conforming to Table 3, the average recommendations, which show the appli-
cability of the safety executive pattern to be used for different safety integrity
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levels, are calculated and demonstrated in Table 4. As shown in the example,
Table 4. Safety recommendations of Safety Executive Pattern
our approach can be used to provide an indication of the severity of failures in
the required application that will use a specific design pattern, by establishing
of the intended safety integrity level and by finding the recommendation for this
design pattern for this safety integrity level.
5 Probability of unsafe failure
As shown previously, it is difficult to find actual values for the risk metric in
design patterns since these patterns describe general abstract solutions. This
part provides a brief description for the parameter that has been used in our
approach to cover the second factor in the risk metric. In general, the main
goal of safety design methods is to reduce the probability of unsafe failure in
the considered system. Therefore, we will use the probability of unsafe failure
(PUF ) as a part of our metric for the risk assessment. This probability will be
calculated in our approach relative to the probability of unsafe failure in a basic
system that includes a single design channel and does not include any specific
safety function.
In a previous paper [11] we have proposed a metric called Relative Safety
Improvement (RSI). This metric is defined as “the percentage improvement
in safety (reduction in probability of unsafe failure) relative to the maximum
possible improvement which can be achieved when the probability of unsafe
failure is reduced to 0”.
For any design pattern, the relative safety improvement can be calculated as
shown in Equation 2:
RSI =
PUF (new) − PUF (old)
0− PUF (old) × 100%
RSI = (1− PUF (new)
PUF (old)
)× 100%
(2)
– RSI: Relative Safety Improvement.
– PUF (old):Probability of unsafe failure in the basic system.
– PUF (new):Probability of unsafe failure in the design pattern.
This part of our metric can be used in the proposed approach: either through
employment of a mathematical modeling for design patterns or by using simula-
tion techniques to demonstrate the safety improvement in each design pattern.
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6 Conclusion
Safety assessment in safety-critical systems design is considered as an essential
step to ensure that the final system is safe. Thus, several assessment methods
and standards have been proposed to cover this process. While these methods
and standards present some risk metrics, none of them can be applied to safety-
critical patterns that address abstract solutions to common problems instead of
real systems.
In this paper, we propose a systematic method to find safety recommenda-
tions at the abstract level of safety-critical design patterns. This method is based
on the recommendations proposed by IEC 61508 standard for safety techniques.
The proposed safety recommendations, which reflect the importance of the ad-
dressed design pattern and severity of target applications, can be used together
with the previously proposed metric (RSI ) as a safety assessment method for
design patterns. The combination of these two parts covers the main parameters:
the frequency of the hazardous events and the consequence of these events, given
in the original risk metric.
While the proposed approach can be used to facilitate the comparison process
between the design patterns under consideration, there are many other factors
that should be taken into consideration to achieve a comprehensive compari-
son. These factors include, among others: reliability, costs, time overhead and
maintainability.
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Abstract. Providing a practical measure of the dependability of dynamic 
systems, including software systems and components, has been an elusive goal 
of systems engineers for some time. Measures for static, individual, 
dependability-relevant properties (e.g. reliability, safety, availability etc.) are 
well understood, but to date there is no general and widely accepted way of 
combining these into a single dependability measure that can be used to assess a  
dynamic system’s capability for specific applications. In this paper we present a 
practical approach for obtaining an Integrated Dependability Measure (IDM) by 
placing the onus on system developers and users to capture the acceptability of 
different behavior in the form of acceptability functions rather than by defining 
(or attempting to define) general purpose combinations of separately 
determined dependability ingredients (e.g. reliability, safety etc.).  
Keywords: Dependability Measure, Dynamic Systems, Behaviour-based 
System description  
1 Introduction 
Dependability is a complex concept which attempts to measure the degree to which 
a user can rely on a system to provide a certain level of service in a certain context 
[1]. There is general consensus on the various ingredients that contribute towards the 
dependability of a system such as reliability, safety, availability etc., and these 
ingredients are well understood [2]. However, even for traditional static systems 
which exhibit only “hard wired” patterns of behavior as they execute, there is no 
accepted generic approach for combining these separate ingredients into a single, 
overall dependability measure, and for dynamic systems which change their state over 
time it is even less clear how a the overall dependability can be represented by a 
combination of these attributes. Most of the approaches are related to binary fault 
models such as fault trees, Markov models or Petri-Nets [3]. These models are 
functional abstractions of the real system and their coincidence with the real system’s 
behavior is difficult to prove [4]. Since dependability in general can also be defined as 
the capability of a system to successfully and safely fulfill its mission [5], the purpose 
of the system must be taken into account explicitly within a dependability measure. 
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One basic problem with trying to define a single unified measure of dependability 
from the traditional ingredients (e.g. reliability, safety etc.) is that their combination is 
highly application specific [6]. Thus, for systems which must satisfy strict safety 
requirements, safety measures must be given a much higher weighting than other 
ingredients such as reliability. In contrast, for systems which must satisfy stringent 
reliability requirements, reliability measures must be given a much higher weighting 
than other dependability ingredients such as safety and availability etc. The net effect 
of dependability’s sensitivity to application specific requirements is that it is 
effectively impossible to define a single, generic way of combining the individual 
measures into a single measure. The definition of single, unified measure has 
therefore remained elusive. 
In this paper we present a practical approach for getting around this problem that 
switches the onus for combining the dependability ingredients to system developers 
and users on a case-by-case basis rather than on researchers to find a single generic 
combination approaches. This is achieved by requiring developers to extend the 
specification of system behavior with so called “acceptability functions”. The 
approach is based on a behavioral description of the system and the measurement and 
assessment of the system outputs [5]. In contrast with traditional specifications which 
merely describe the expected behavior of the system in response to stimuli, a 
specification enhanced with acceptability functions describes “how well” the range of 
possible behaviors of the system meet the requirements. In other words, an 
acceptability function describes (in terms of a value between (0..1) how “acceptable” 
a particular behavior of the system is for the application in hand. When defining this 
acceptability function, the system developer has to take into account the appropriate 
weightings of the different factors such as reliability, safety, performance etc. and 
give them the corresponding influence on the acceptability value. By moving the 
problem of weighting the different ingredients to a user-defined acceptability function 
a single, unified approach can be used to calculate and compare overall dependability 
measures.  
In contrast to the classical reliability engineering approach where the source of 
faults is not taken into account, in our approach we consider the behavior of dynamic 
systems. Therefore systems are described using models with uncertainty combining 
deterministic and stochastic processes. For reliability investigations, our assessment 
strategy is based on the hypothesis testing approaches commonly used in many 
disciplines, e.g. metrology and psychology, to determine the level to which a 
particular hypothesis is valid in a particular scenario. The problem of estimating a 
system’s capability for a new application is then cast as the problem of establishing 
the likelihood that a given level of service (the hypothesis) will be delivered by a 
specific system in a given context based on the previous tests performed on that 
system. Another major advantage of the approach is that it lends itself to use of tests 
sheets [7] to define and apply the tests used to ascertain the dependability of a system 
and to document how the acceptability functions are used to calculate the final 
dependability measure [8]. 
In this paper we provide an overview of our Integrated Dependability Metric 
(IDM) approach and explain how system specifications can be enhanced with 
acceptability functions to combine dependability ingredients in an application specific 
way. This is demonstrated through a small case study for a dynamic control system.  
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Theory 
There are various different ways to describe dynamic systems, which can be 
classified as parametric/non-parametric and stochastic/non-stochastic models (see 
Table 1). In system theory, parametric input-output and state space models are very 
common, and are often enhanced by additional noise terms to model the stochastic 
part of the system.  
 
Table 1: Model classification 
 
 
This kind of model covers a broad range of applications. In contrast to pure 
stochastic models the output values are generally correlated, i.e. the random noise due 
a stochastic process is modified by the system transfer function. Thus, not only the 
distribution in the amplitude but also the distribution over the time domain is an 
important property of a stochastic variable. Furthermore deterministic output errors 
can be modelled as a result of parameter errors in the system transfer function. For 
physical systems, samples are directly related to the time at which the samples are 
taken, e.g. using a specified sampling rate. For other systems like software systems 
this sampling time is not obvious. Therefore it may be abstracted using an ordered 
series of samples instead.  
Safety-critical physical states can be represented as internal states in the state space 
representation. However, as long they can be measured, critical states may be visible 
as output values of input-output systems. In order to fit the black-box view of many 
other disciplines, including software engineering the input-output representation for 
dynamic systems is preferred in this paper.  
Dependability Measure 
The dependability measure defined in this paper is based on the definition of 
dependability for autonomous systems [5] and enhanced by an additional stochastic 
view of the system model. Furthermore, the validation against specified system 
properties plays a major role. The formal definition of our dependability measure 
makes the following assumptions: 
1. The specification and the realization of a dynamic system are given: i.e. the 
purpose of the system (usage, mission), the behavioural, structural, 
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functional and non-functional properties, environmental conditions and 
system boundaries, 
2. The system is operated in an environment with uncertainty, i.e. it is not 
exactly known if errors in the output behaviour are due to disturbances or 
system faults. 
3. The correctness of known system properties is verified by other means 
4. Faults will happen! 
The required dependability measure D describes the correspondence of the actual 
system behaviour to its specified behaviour within the system boundaries and 
according to acceptance criteria. The dependability measure is an objective value and 
therefore free from any human perception and interpretation. The dependability 
measure is a functional, which depends on the actual system output behaviour y, the 
specified reference behaviour yr,, system boundaries and acceptance criteria , a  
mission u (finite set of input test trajectories corresponding to the usage of the system) 
and a number of acceptability functions corresponding to the measured dimension of 
dependability.  
As the Integrated Dependability Measure (IDM) for safety-critical computer 
controlled systems we propose the (time) discrete function: 
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with normalized acceptability factors jj AA 1  corresponding to the 
dependability component j with dimension d and the k-th sample of a mission of 
length m. For practical purposes, the acceptability factors jA  are normalized 
functions with values in the interval [0, 1]. The values are added using weighting 
factors resulting in the overall dependability function. Thus, dependability is a unique 
normalized value in the range [0, 1] (0 means undependable and 1 dependable) taking 
account of all possible system impairments during a mission. Both the actual 
behaviour and the reference behaviour are considered to be the system response on a 
set of predefined input trajectories called reference missions or usage profiles of the 
system. The reference behaviour represents the desired (expected) system response 
during the application of a specific input trajectory. Depending on the concrete system 
description the test inputs may be fixed trajectories or generated from a test pattern 
generator (e.g. test sheets or Markov-processes for stochastic systems). Prior to the 
execution of the test mission the system is initialized. In order to validate specified 
system properties, a set of criteria related to system behaviour and properties is 
explicitly included in the acceptability functions. Since performance, safety, 
complexity, etc. are often concurrent design parameters, the weights must be chosen 
by the system designer according to the system requirements.  
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Acceptability factors for dynamic system performance 
The definition of errors is domain specific. For instance, in standard software 
technology only the correctness of a result is important and the error is modelled as a 
binary decision about the acceptance of the result. However in the scope of safety-
critical real-time systems also the gradual degraded state must be considered.  
As a basis function for several accessibility measures the relative deviation for 
sample k 
p
krk
krel y
yy
e ,,
 , (2) 
related to the specified (maximum) error yp can be used. However, erel,k may have 
unlimited positive and negative values. Therefore we propose the squared exponential 
function of erel for the definition of an acceptability term for the system performance: 







 
2
,
, exp
p
krk
keperformanc y
yy
A , (3) 
which has a range of [0, 1] and which is approximately (1-e²rel) for small values of 
erel. In case of a non-stochastic dynamic system this term reflects the structural and 
parameter uncertainty of the modelled system. If the system output is a vector y of 
dimension d the Euclidian norm is used to determine the absolute value. In the case of 
stochastic systems erel can be further evaluated by error statistics getting the meaning 
of reliability. Depending on how the system is described and what system property 
shall be highlighted (e.g. reliability or safety) the appropriate element of y must be 
chosen. In case of reliability, the output value is related to the service the system 
delivers. In the case of safety, the output value is related to critical system states (see 
example below). Furthermore, the test mission set must be carefully selected to cover 
the range of system outputs for the system properties under consideration. 
Reliability of dynamic systems 
For systems of high reliability the failure rate during normal operation is low. 
Generally, reliability parameters are determined using a large number of identical 
parts or many samples on one special system. However, for practical reliability 
evaluation of one system the lifetime may be shorter than the time needed to take the 
required number of samples.  
The dependability concept presented here constitutes a generalisation of reliability 
and safety engineering concepts for dynamic systems. Consequently, the 
dependability measure should also include the special case of the reliability of static 
systems. Compared to established reliability measures using a binary fault model, 
here the gradual derivation of the system output can be used to reduce the testing 
effort. 
In order to demonstrate this concept the system is modelled as a deterministic 
input-output system with stochastic uncertainty. The output value depends 
deterministically on an input stimulus, described by a constant transfer function 
known in advance. The output values are superimposed by a pure stochastic process 
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with independent samples. Thus, the stochastic process corresponds to the deviation 
of the actual output from the specified output. We assume that non-stochastic and 
stochastic process can be separated by subtracting both values.  
Special case: Reliability of dynamic systems with noise 
In contrast to static systems the output value of dynamic stochastic system depends 
not only on the actual input value, but also on the actual system state, which results 
from former input values and the initial value of the system. Generally the output 
values are correlated in the time domain, because independent input values, e.g. white 
noise, are modified through the dynamic system transfer function. Besides the 
probability density function (PDF) over the value range, the distribution of the output 
values over the time, respectively, the frequency spectrum, must be considered. 
Accordingly, the times where samples are taken must go along a system trajectory.  
In this case we propose to collect output data from uncorrelated submissions and 
treat them as independent sample. To measure the proposed reliability factor it must 
be assured that the system did not change in between. For software systems, for 
example, this can be done by re-initialising the system.  
Special case: Reliability of stationary systems 
In this section the system under consideration is specified as a probabilistic system 
with the output variable y, statistically independent normal distributed output values, a 
mean value µ=0, and a standard deviation of . Furthermore, it is required, that the 
absolute value of y does not exceed the maximum value ymax with a probability of Psys 
for each sample of y. Thus Psys is a reliability measure for mean failures per 
invocation. The conditional probability  
),0,()|( 0max0max  yyyP   (4) 
can be calculated using the cumulative distribution function ),0,( 0max y  according 
to the normal distribution of y, µ=0, and the specified value  for the standard 
deviation. 
Consequently, the overall probability for an error free system is 
)()|()( 00max0max   PyyPyyPPsys , (5) 
i.e. the product of the conditional probability of having no errors 
  1)|( 0maxyyP  and the probability of being in the specified range 
  1)( 0P . 
Accordingly, we can find an upper limit  
  )(1)( 0max0max yyPyyPPsys  (6) 
for the overall error-probability (unreliability). Corresponding to the required 
reliability and the known PDF the value is specified during system design.  In 
order to test the system against its specification, it is not necessary to measure the 
absolute value of the reliability. The -value indicates the level of confidence the 
specified reliability has been reached. If the output samples are collected over a 
number of test missions,  
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yreliabilitA  (7) 
can be used as an acceptability function for software reliability.  
The system validation is now restricted to the test of the output value’s distribution 
parameters, in this example the standard deviation, which can be performed using 
well known hypothesis tests. We assume that the PDF of the system output is known 
from long term experience, which is the normal distribution function in our case. 
Otherwise, tests known from textbooks can be used to test the PDF [9]. 
The hypothesis H0: 20
2    shall be validated by falsification of the counter 
hypothesis H1: 20
2    with a confidence level 1-, i.e. the probability of accepting 
H0 although H1 is true is less than .  
Since the real value of  is unknown, the sample standard deviation s over a set of 
n sampled output values yi, i=1..n will be used for further calculation. 
For a given confidence level  = f( 2 ;1 n ) the test condition for rejecting H1 is 
given by  
2
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sn  (8) 
with the critical value 2 ;1 n  of the -distribution with momentum n-1. The value 
2
;1 n can be calculated according to the approximation formula  
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of Wilson and Hilferty with the critical value of the normal distribution y. Since  
decreases more than exponentially with y, the number of samples required only 
increases weakly with decreasing  with  
  23/20
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s
y
n . (10) 
In contrast, standard software verification techniques using the zero-error 
hypothesis need a sample size of the order O(ln/p) [10], which may be problematic 
for seldom events with a small probability p. This result is not surprising, because the 
proposed approach uses the complete information over the distribution of the output 
samples and not just the binary decision about the acceptance of the sample. 
Furthermore the assumption of a zero-error system is often not realistic and the 
measured confidence level corresponds to the error probability of the test and not to a 
system property. In case of the continuous model the –value corresponds to the 
confidence in the specified system and its parameters allowing an estimation of future 
system behaviour.  
If the system output has a mean value µ≠0 the complete PDF will be shifted on the 
y-axis resulting in an increase of the error probability P(µ)/P(µ=0)=1+For small 
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positive values of µ the error probability increases approximate linearly with 
=µ·ymax/². Generally, ymax and  are given by the system specification and µ/ 
corresponds to the relative deterministic deviation of the system response erel, i.e. in 
the probabilistic case erel has the meaning of a reliability decrease factor due to the 
non-probabilistic part of the system.  
 
Fig. 2. Relative Increase of the error probability due to shift of the average value (blue line: ymax 
= red line: ymax =3 green line: ymax =6) 
Safety of dynamic systems 
Generally, in the literature safety measures are probabilistic concepts based on 
binary accident events [3][4]. In order to find a safety measure describing the 
degraded state of a deterministic system the concept of the dynamic safety margin 
(DSM) is used [11]. In this concept the safety margin is the distance  to the system 
boundary given by safety critical physical states, e.g. the pressure in a chemical 
reactor.  In control engineering the measured DSM can be used in order to optimize or 
to adapt a controller during system operation.  
Here, the DSM concept is generalized for safety-critical computer systems as a 
measure of how far a system is away from the critical state. Using an input-output 
description of the system, all safety-critical physical states must be accessible from 
outside the system or subsystem measured by the output value y. Similar to the 
performance acceptability a safety acceptability factor can be derived utilizing the 
DSM normalized to specified maximum deviation of the output value yS.  
We propose: 




2
, exp
s
k
ksafety y
A  , (11) 
For dynamic systems with additional noise the DSM concept can be treated like the 
reliability concept, if we replace the maximum allowed deviation of the system output 
by the DSM. Thus the probability of reaching a critical state can be determined. 
International Workshop on 
the Design of Dependable Critical Systems 
September 15, 2009, Hamburg, Germany 
 
24
Illustrative Example 
In order to illustrate the concept of dependability measure a simple heating control 
system is described in this section. The heating system consists of a radiator, a 
switching controller and a temperature sensor. The controller gets the desired 
temperature yr from the input and the actual temperature y from the sensor. If the 
difference of both temperatures leaves a specified range the controller switches the 
radiator ON (uk=1) or OFF (uk=0) corresponding to the control law: 
initial value OFF 
if (yr(k)-y(k))>0.1 && OFF than ON; 
if (yr(k)-y(k))<-0.1 && ON than OFF; 
The radiator temperature has an input-output behaviour corresponding to a first 
order system (low pass) with a time constant of 2300 s yielding the time-discrete 
transfer function 
kkkk uyy  03.03.09996.01  (12) 
with the system input uk (power in watt) and the output yk (°C), normal distributed 
white noise k, and the sample period t. For simplification the index k is used for all 
variables instead of kt, i.e. yk = y(kt). The specified deviation is 0 = 0.15°C. The 
maximum absolute temperature is ymax = 40°C. As a test trajectory a biased sinusoidal 
input is applied with yr,k=38.5°C+sin(2·0.001·kt), m=1000, k = 0..m, t = 1s, and 
initial output value y0 = 38°C.  
The acceptability functions are defined according to (3), (7), and (11) with yp=60, 
ys=0, =y- ymax. The dependability of dimension d=3 is defined according to (1) with 
the acceptability functions A1=Aperformance, A2=Asafety, A3=Areliability, and weighting 
a1=0.3, a2=0.4, a3=0.3.  
The unacceptability of the reliability factor (-value) depends on the number of 
samples taken. In the test case n = 100 samples are taken from independent runs, for 
one special instance of time. Corresponding to the low-pass behaviour of our system, 
the output deviation values are correlated in the short time range, leading to smaller s 
values. In order to get uncorrelated samples, the system relaxation time must be 
awaited before the samples are taken. The time-dependent -values are shown in 
table 2, which increase with time. 
Table 2: Sample of the time-dependent standard deviation of the system output and -value for 
n = 100. 
t (s) s (°C) 
10 0.1021 7.9134e-005 
100 0.1029 9.6890e-005 
1000 0.1047 1.5333e-004 
 
The actual output and the reference output are shown in fig. 3a). The actual output 
has a noticeable noise in addition to the reference value. Correspondingly, 
performance acceptability fig. 3b), blue line, is also noisy and the corresponding 
cumulative function fig. 3b), green line, increases with number of samples 
accumulated.  
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Fig. 3. a) System reference output (green line) and actual output (blue line); b) Performance 
(un)acceptability (blue line) and cumulative value (green line); c) Safety (un)acceptability (blue 
line) and cumulative value (green line); d) Overall system dependability. 
Fig. 3c) shows the safety acceptability which has peak values in the sample range 
n=300..400. Within this range the system output has the minimum distance to the 
maximum system output (see fig. 3a). The overall dependability is plotted in figure 
3d). It is obvious that the dependability decreases monotonically. The maximum slope 
is in the range where the weighted sum of all acceptability terms reaches its maximum 
as well. Therefore, the peaks in the safety function are visible as strong decreases of 
dependability.  
Conclusion 
In this paper an Integrated Dependability Measure (IDM) for dynamic systems was 
proposed combining acceptability factors for different dependability relevant system 
properties. The approach is based on a behavioral system description which 
generalizes diverse system descriptions techniques from different disciplines, e.g. 
systems, hardware and software engineering, human factor engineering. The measure 
is suitable for stochastic as well as for non-stochastic system models and related 
properties.  The measure is a functional of the specified behavior represented by the 
reference output trajectory, the actual behavior represented by the actual output 
trajectory and a specified mission represented by a test input trajectory. Furthermore 
criteria are defined by which the system can be validated. Thus, the dependability 
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measure does not describe the system behavior directly, but how much it deviates 
from the expected behavior.  
The simulation example shows that using the dependability measure (1) the input-
output behavior of a system can be validated against its specifications in relation to 
dependability requirements. As a special case, reliability metrics can also be included 
in the measure. Considering dynamic systems we have to project the system trajectory 
by reducing the time dimension to one single value in order to obtain stationary 
reliability values. Additionally, a method is proposed to validate the reliability by 
comparing the distribution of output values with a defined probability density 
function. This approach reduces the number of required samples significantly, which 
is necessary for a practical application. In this case, the absolute value of the failure 
probability is not required. In contrast, the deviation of the reliability from the 
specified value is measure indirectly. This also enables new testing methods to be 
used. In the future, the unified dependability measure will be applied and evaluated 
for additional systems covering typical examples of human factor engineering. 
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Abstract. Determining a system or component’s dependability invariably involves 
some kind of statistical analysis of a large number of tests of its behavior under 
typical usage conditions, regardless of the particular collection of attributes chosen to 
measure dependability. The number of factors that can affect the final figure is 
therefore quite large, and includes such things as the ordering of system operation 
invocations, the test cases (i.e. the parameter values and expected outcomes), the 
acceptability of different operation invocation results and the cumulative effect of the 
results over different usage scenarios. Quoting a single dependability number is 
therefore of little value without a clear presentation of the accompanying factors that 
generated it. Today, however, there is no compact or unified approach for 
representing this information in a way that makes it possible to judge dynamic 
systems and components for their dependability for particular applications. To address 
this problem, in this paper we describe a new, compact approach for presenting the 
tests used to determine a dynamic system’s dependability along with the statistical 
operations used to turn them into a single measure. 
1 Introduction 
Quantifying the dependability of software components and dynamic systems is a 
major challenge. In contrast with traditional “hard-wired” systems whose behavior 
remains fixed (or should remain fixed) as they execute, dynamic systems change their 
apparent behavior as time goes by – in other words, they remember the effects of 
previous operations and modify their behavior accordingly. According to this 
definition, most none trivial software systems and components are dynamic systems. 
Because of the memory effect, the dependability of dynamic systems cannot be 
calculated from a single metric derived by the repetitive application of a fixed 
evaluation criterion (e.g. MTTF from system failures or availability from system 
crashes etc.). Instead, the dependability of dynamic systems has to be determined 
from compound measures obtained by applying different evaluation criteria to the 
system’s behavior using non-trivial scenarios resembling typical usage patterns. Only 
then does a dependability measure give a true estimate of the lilkihood that a dynamic 
system will deliver satisfactory service in a typical usage situation. 
Intuitively, Dependability is a measure of the degree to which the users of a system 
can justifiably rely on the service it delivers – that is, its behavior. In general, there 
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are numerous properties or attributes of a system that influence its dependability, 
including [1][2]: 
 
• Availability: the readiness for usage 
• Reliability: the continuity of correct  service 
• Safety: the non-occurrence of catastrophic consequences on the environment 
• Confidentiality: the non-occurrence of unauthorized disclosure of 
information 
• Integrity: the non-occurrence of improper alterations of information 
 
However, combining these separate factors into a single dependability measure is a 
highly application specific problem and there is currently no widely accepted theory 
that can be applied in a general way across different domains. To address this 
problem, the Ecomodis project has developed an approach to dependability 
specification and measurement that uses user-defined acceptability functions to 
provide an application-specific measure of a service’s acceptability [3]. By observing 
a systems behavior over a series of carefully defined tests that mimic its real usage 
environment a picture of the system’s overall behavior can be developed, and by 
using hypothesis-measurement statistics from such fields as psychology, a measure of 
a system’s likely dependability for new applications can be obtained.  
This approach relies on the clear and precise description of the tests used to 
exercise a system as well as the system’s response to those test. However, traditional 
testing technology provides no concise way of describing such complex test scenarios 
or how the results of the tests are combined into higher-order measures. The most 
common way of doing this today is to write a software program in a general purpose 
programming language like Java or C++ that performs all the tests and applies the 
necessary statistical calculations to the results. However, just as with mainstream 
testing techniques based on standard software packages such as JUnit [4], this 
approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the ingredients and approach used are 
only understandable to software engineers who are familiar with the programming 
language used. Domain experts and managers who are unfamiliar with programming 
are unable to understand such descriptions. Second, even for people with the 
necessary expertise, the important information is obscured in a lot of superfluous 
programming “scaffolding” needed to create correct programs in the language 
concerned. This not only obscures the key test information and makes it more difficult 
to see, it also makes the task of writing correct descriptions more arduous and error 
prone. 
To address this problem, the Ecomodis project has developed a new test 
specification technique to support the Ecomodis dependability model [3]. This 
approach, known as “Test Sheets” [5], was developed to combine the simplicity and 
readability of tabular test definition approaches such as FIT [6] with the flexibility of 
programmatic test definition approaches such as JUnit into a single unified approach 
based on the ubiquitous metaphor of spreadsheets. As well as allowing simple 
sequences of operation invocations (test cases) to be defined with the same expressive 
power as programming languages (but without the superfluous programming 
scaffolding) the approach also allows test case definitions to be nested to arbitrary 
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levels and parameterized in arbitrary ways. In contrast with programmatic 
approaches, test sheets can also describe the results of tests. To support the 
assessment of dependability, standard test sheets have been enhanced with (a) an 
additional set of columns which describe the satisfaction functions (in input test 
sheets) and the satisfaction values (in output test sheets) defined on operation 
input/output values, and (b) an additional row that allows statistical operations to be 
applied to these acceptability values and other values derived from the test. In this 
paper we provide an overview of this enhanced form of test sheet and explain the new 
features designed to support the measurement and specification of the dependability 
of dynamic systems. We first describe the basic principles behind test sheets and then 
show how they are used through a small case study. 
Expressing Usage Profiles with Test Sheets 
The Test Sheet approach is a metaphor for test definition, application, and 
reporting which attempts to combine the power of programmatic approaches to testing 
with the readability and ease-of-use of tabular approaches. To achieve this goal a 
spreadsheet metaphor is used to identify the inputs to, and outputs from, operation 
invocations and express relationships between them. When complete, a language-
independent test sheet can be transformed into source code in a specific target 
language for execution. Once executed, the test results can be visualized as a result 
test sheet. Furthermore, Test Sheets allow the definition of probabilistic or 
deterministic description of the test execution, thus allowing all kinds of behavioural 
protocols, algorithms [7] or any probabilistic operational profiles [8]to be defined. 
To illustrate how test sheets support the process of measuring primitive 
dependability metrics and their combination into higher-order, compound metrics we 
use the example of a calculator. This component offers a number of mathematical 
operations that can be separated into two distinct groups that provide the basis for two 
different usage profiles: 
 
• basic operations: add, subtract, multiply and divide  
• advanced operations: log, sqrt, pow. 
 
One usage profile characterizes applications that only use the basic operations of 
the calculator such as accounting applications. The other usage profile characterizes 
applications that also used the advanced operations such as  scientific applications. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the test definitions for the basic and the advanced usage 
profiles respectively.  
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Figure 1 Test Sheet for the basic usage scenario 
The Test Sheet in Figure 1 tests the calculator component using a basic usage 
scenario. The first line initializes the component, while lines 2 to 5 invoke the basic 
arithmetic operations with random values. More specifically, line 2 invokes the add 
operation (cell B2) of the calculator object returned from first operation (cell A2) with 
two random values uniformly distributed between 1 and 100 with a step width of 0.5 
(cells C2 and D2). The result of the computation is compared against the sum of the 
two parameters to determine its correctness (cell E2).  
The order in which these operations are invoked is defined by the behavioral 
information in lines 6 to 8 which represents a simple state machine. Execution starts 
with line 6. Cell A5 states that with a probability of 100% the control flow will be 
transferred to line 7 after performing the operation invocation in line 1, the 
initialization. Cell A7 to E7 define the relative probabilities of subsequent operations.  
If any of the cells A7 to D7 is selected, the execution state returns to line 7 after the 
corresponding operation invocation is performed. However, if cell E7 is selected 
(which has a probability of 10%) the control flow will be transferred to line 8, which 
is empty, thus terminating the test execution. The state machine represented by this 
test sheet is shown as a UML state diagram in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2 Test Sheet for the advanced usage scenario 
Figure 2 shows the test sheet representing the advanced usage scenario. In order to 
validate the return values of the advanced operations, a helper component is 
introduced that serves as a test oracle. The helper object is initialized in line 2 after 
the initialization of the calculator component. Lines 7 through 12 show how results 
returned by invocation of the advanced operations (lines 8, 10 and 12) are verified 
using results derived from operations of the helper component (lines 7, 9 and 11 
respectively). In line 7, the log operation of the helper is invoked to obtain the value  
used to verify the result returned by the calculator’s log operation. In line 8, that log 
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operation is invoked just like the basic operations in lines 3 to 6. However, in this 
case the input parameters are exactly the same as those used in the invocation of the 
helper component, indicated by the references to cells C7 and D7. The result of the 
calculator’s log operation can thus be verified by comparing the value returned by the 
calculator to that returned by the helper component (cell E8). As before, the order of 
operation invocations is determined by the behavioural part of the test sheet in lines 
13 through to 16.  This is illustrated as a state diagram in Figure 4. In line 13 a 
decision is made whether to execute either a basic operation (line 14), an advanced 
operation (line 15) or to terminate the test execution (line 16) with the specified 
relative probabilities. In lines 14 and 15, the lines that represent the operations of the 
calculator are executed and the control flow is transferred to line 13 again, thus 
starting another loop through the algorithm. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 State diagram basic scenario Figure 4 State diagram advanced scenario 
Test Sheet Extension for Dependability Measurement 
The test sheets shows in the previous section are “standard” test sheets that can be 
used to define ordinary tests. Their strength is that by supporting the definition of 
behavioral information, components can be tested using realisitic, non-trivial 
scenarios. This provides the basis for obtaining meaningful dependability measures. 
However, it does not yet support the application of acceptability functions, nor the 
combination of acceptability values into higher-order measures. To support these, two 
further enhancements are introduced: acceptability cells and summary cells. 
Acceptability Cells 
To support the application of acceptability functions, an additional column group 
called acceptability cells is added to the right side of the standard test sheet layout 
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(see Figure 5 Figure 7). These columns allow one or more satisfaction values to be 
calculated as defined by the equation or operation invocation in each cell. The 
contents of these cells can use the full expressive power of test sheets, like arithmetic 
expressions, cell references, etc. This allows the computation of complex metrics 
based on the runtime behavior of the component being tested. 
Figure 5 shows the enhanced tests sheet corresponding to the simple scenario in 
Figure 1, illustrating the use of acceptability cells. The test sheets measures the 
acceptability of the results returned by the basic operations by computing the absolute 
delta between the returned and expected values. Line 2, in Figure 5 invokes the add 
method of the calculator component and the resulting value is stored in cell E2.  
 
 
Figure 5 Enhanced Test Sheet for Basic Usage Scenario  
The formula for the acceptability value first computes the delta between the 
returned and the expected result: 
C2+D2 – E2 
and then computes the absolute value of that delta: 
|C2+D2 – E2| 
This absolute delta is then put into a normalization function, in this case:  
1/(x+1) 
Figure 6 shows a plot of this function. The domain of the function is  [0,!] while 
the codomain is (0,1]. Hence the maximum value of the function is 1 for x = 0. The 
function is monotonically non-increasing so the value decreases for x-values greater 
then 0. 
 
 
Figure 6 Normalisation Function: 1 / (x+1) 
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The complete formula is: 
1/(|C2+D2-E2|+1) 
Notice that this is only one possible acceptability function and the user is free to 
define computation formulas as needed. An additional option that becomes possible 
with acceptability cells is to use them to define the binary fail/pass criterion in the 
associated “Result Cells”. In this case, the test will be marked as failed if the value of 
the satisfaction function is lower than 0.99 (cell E2). 
 
Figure 7 shows the enhanced test sheet for the advanced usage scenario. In this 
case the acceptability of the advanced operation is calculated with a helper 
component. Instead of calculating the expected result inline as with the basic 
operations, the result of the helper component and the returned result of the calculator 
component are directly plugged into the function described before. 
 
 
Figure 7 Enhanced Test Sheet for Advanced Usage Scenario  
Summary Cells 
To allow high-order values to be derived from the information in the acceptability 
and result cells a new area containing the summary cells has been introduced beneath 
the definition of the behavior. These cells not only contain the formulas or 
invocations used to determine new higher-order values, they also represent return 
values of the test sheet for potential use in higher order test sheets. The keyword 
"errors" generates a list of cells that failed the check against the expected result.  
Similar to the formula notation supported by spreadsheets users may define arbitrary 
formulas for the calculation of further return values. 
Summary cells enable the user to define computations that summarize the 
behaviour of the component during the test, thus allowing the definition of 
dependability metrics and the calculation of higher order measures in a consistent and 
readable way. Using higher-order test sheets that allow test sheets to be arranged in 
hierarchies, the return values of the test sheet invocations, i.e. the lower level 
summary measures, can be used for further computations. This allows different 
dependability measures to be further merged into a single compound measure. The 
test sheets in Figures 5 and 7 contain summary cells. In the case of the basic usage 
scenario (Figure 5) the first summary value is the list of failed cells, the second is the 
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average normalized deviation from the reference result, and the third is the 
normalized deviation. In the case of the advanced usage scenario (Figure 7) the same 
summary values are computed. Notice that in this case only cells that carry a value are 
relevant to the calculation, e.g. cell E7 will be left out when calculating the average or 
sum. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we described how test sheet can be used to support the measurement 
and specification of system dependability, and presented two enhancements to 
standard test sheets introduced for this purpose. Because of tests sheets’ ability to 
define behavioural information it is possible to test dynamic systems with realistic 
usage patterns, thus enabling the assessment of meaningful dependability measures. 
The first enhancement to standard test sheets is the introduction of a new column 
group to support the application of acceptability functions. These complement the 
result cells (that represent a binary decision on a test's success) using a continuous 
measure for the evaluation of the test results. The second enhancement is the 
introduction of a row group for the application of statistical operations to the test's 
return values. This facilitates the computation of compound measures and their 
presentation in a consistent and understandable way.  
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Abstract. The early fault analysis is mandatory for safety critical sys-
tems, which are required to operate safely even on the presence of faults.
System design methodologies tackle the early design and verification of
systems by allowing several abstraction for their models, but still offer
only digital bit faults as fault models. Therefore we develop a signal fault
model for the Transaction-Level Modeling. We extend the TLM generic
payload by the signal characteristics: Voltage level, delay, slope time and
glitches. In order to analyze and process these, a TLM bus model is
created, with which signal faults can be detected and translated to data
failures. Furthermore, inserting this bus in an acquisition system and im-
plementing fallback modes for the bus operation, the propagation of the
signal faults through the system can be assessed. Simulating this model
using probability distributions for the different signal faults, 5516 faults
have been generated. From these, 5143 have been recovered, 239 isolated
and 134 turned into failures.
Key words: Signal faults, mixed signal verification, system design, fault
modeling, system model
1 Introduction
Safety critical systems have to operate safely even on the presence of faults. It
means that malfunctioning components have to be located and its faults isolated,
so that it does not propagate to its user. The behavior of the system on the
presence of faults can be analyzed using a model of the system. For that, faults
and methods for localization, isolation and correction have to be modeled. In the
? Raul S. Fajardo Silva and Reinhard Ma¨nner are with the Department for Applica-
tion Specific Computing. Ju¨rgen Hesser is with the Institute of Experimental Radio-
therapy, University of Heidelberg, Theodor-Kutzer-Ufer, 1-3, DE 68167-Mannheim,
Germany.
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2 Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System
case of an acquisition system the communication buses connected to the sensors
are influenced externally by the environment and by each communicating node,
being a critical point of the design.
The early design of complex hardware systems including software and hard-
ware parts, interfacing with the real world and user is aided nowadays by system
design methodologies. System design [1] abstracts the behavior of the system
components by the specification of its function. In order to effectively design
system communication, the Transaction-Level Model has been developed [2]. It
allows the design of the communication to be independent from the components
or architecture design. Furthermore the detail of the model can span from func-
tion calls to pin signaling.
In this paper we analyze the propagation of signal faults through a syn-
chronous bus in a Transaction-Level model of an acquisition system. This system
is composed by multiple sensors connected to a bus, a bus master and a CPU,
which pools the data. First the bus, its modes and operating characteristics are
modeled. The selection algorithm of fallback mode is placed on the communica-
tion controller, the bus master. For the fault injection, probability distributions
are defined for the characteristics of the signal: Delay, slope level, voltage level
and glitches, thus statistically generating faults. This faults are traced by the
model so that their propagation results can be later evaluated.
The next section explains the bus model, its operating modes, the fault anal-
ysis and fault procesing modules. Section 3 presents the acquisition architecture
simulated in this paper, the fallback selection algorithm and the fault genera-
tion, followed by the simulation results. In section 4 the conclusion of the work
is presented.
2 Bus Model
In order to model a signal fault aware bus and its fallback modes, the TLM
library is used. The actual standard considers performance issues related to the
communication, but does not include operating characteristics to assure commu-
nication. The standard comprehends standard blocking and non-blocking trans-
port interfaces and defines a standard payload1 which includes performance
characteristics, such as delay and latency [2]. We extend this standard pay-
load to include the signal quality factors: Delay, slope level, voltage level and
glitches, which are directly related to the bus operating capability. Furthermore,
the model of the synchronous bus holds its operation mode: Operating frequency,
clock phase and connected nodes.
Payload extensions contain both the value of signal characteristics of the
transmission and a record of the violation of their limit (i.e. signal failure).
When forwarding read calls, the extension is ignored, the signal characteristics
are set by the callee. When the callee sends back the payload, the bus analyzes
these, assigning the correspondent signal failure if the bus operation limits are
1 An instance of the standard payload corresponds to a packet, when modeling a
regular communication protocol.
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Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System 3
exceeded. Furthermore the bus modifies the payload transmitted data, according
to the occurred signal failures. At last, the complete payload is sent to the caller,
fig. 1. Based on the failure record, the caller can then decide to change the
operation mode in order to avoid further failure. On write calls, the bus first
analyzes the signal characteristics and processes the data, then forwards these
to the callee, ignoring the extension on return, fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Write and read calls to the bus (* represent that the variable has been set, **
modified)
2.1 Modeling Signal Faults
Prototype based communication monitoring techniques of [3] and [4] categorize
bit faults, glitches and delays. [5] define possible signal faults of car sensors, as
abnormal magnitudes (voltage levels), rolling (slope times), noise and depen-
dency faults (context dependent). We categorize signal and bit faults related to
digital hardware communication as a combination of both. A digital signal is
ideally represented by two voltage levels, with instantaneous switching between
both levels. For a real electronic component to drive its output from one logic
level to the other, the resulting signal has a slope time , which can be measured
as a time degraded behavior. The same applies for delays, which represent the
response time of a component. Degraded voltage levels are variations of the
output voltages for the logic levels approaching its boundaries, while glitches are
voltage pulses of short duration resulting from interferences from outside. These
four signal and bit faults of digital signals (fig. 2) are used as quality measure-
ment of a transmission. These are then further divided for the characterization
of a complete frame, composing the actual signal characteristics included in the
payload extension: Both high and low bits voltage level; rise and fall time; delay;
glitch time, level and count.
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4 Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System
θ
θ
V
clk
data
Φs
: voltage level violation
Φs: sampling phase
Φ0 = 0° Φ0 = 360°
Φd: delay phase
Φd
ΔΦf
ΔΦf: fall phase (ΔΦr rise phase)
Φg
ΔVg
ΔVg: glitch voltage 
Φg: glitch phase
VH
VL
VH: high voltage level
VL: low voltage level
Fig. 2. Time normalized signal characteristics (time multiplied by operating frequency
resulting in phase values)
Signal Conditions Signal Failure Detection Processing on Data
VH < 2.0V
High bit
All 1s to 0s
Voltage Level
VL > 0.8V
Low bit
All 0s to 1s
Voltage level
φd > φs Delay Rotate data to the right
φd + φr > φs Rise time
Assuming x[n] the
series of the data bits
y[n] =
(
0, x[n− 1] = 0
x[n], otherwise
φd + φf > φs Fall time
Assuming x[n] the
series of the data bits
y[n] =
(
1, x[n− 1] = 1
x[n], otherwise
Glitch count > 0
Glitch time Nothing
φs − 18◦ < φg < φs + 18◦
VH −∆Vg < 2.0 Glitch high level If glitch timeAll 1s to 0s
∆Vg + VL > 0.8 Glitch low level
If glitch time
All 0s to 1s
Table 1. Signal conditions for signal failure detection (limit for bus operation) &
Processing of the data according to detected signal failure (for the series, index 0 is bit
7 for a byte)
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Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System 5
2.2 Fault Analysis and Processing
This module analyzes the signal characteristics of data being transmitted through
the bus. The data sender sets the signal characteristics for the transmission.
These are then compared to the conditions on table 1 to detect signal failures.
The listed conditions are based on the limits imposed by the operation of the
bus. For comparison, the timing signal characteristics are normalized to phase
signal characteristics depending on the operating frequency of the bus. The bus
operation conditions, sample time and clock phase are merged to the φs sam-
pling phase. Logic levels and sample time are implementation dependent and
thus constant, not influencing the relationship between operation mode and vi-
olation limits. Signal failures lead to data failure. In order to model that, the
processes described in table 1 are carried out for each detected violation.
3 Acquisition Architecture
The architecture modules, acquisition CPU, bus master and sensors are mod-
eled in SystemC using the Loosely-Timed coding style of the Transaction-Level
Model, calling thus blocking transport only. The architecture connects the ac-
quisition CPU to the bus master, which is connected to the sensors through the
previously modeled TLM bus, fig. 3.
In the model of the acquisition CPU, only the acquisition pooling function
is modeled. The bus master contains a thread safe buffer implementation, which
is accessed by the CPU. To the other side it interfaces with the bus, executing
two tasks. First, it request the data of every sensor. Then, if the bus detected a
signal failure the bus master may change the operation mode of the bus and retry
transmission. Furthermore, the operation mode of the bus can be periodically
reset to raise bus performance, this also reconnects previously isolated nodes,
which might have been faulty for a short period of time only.
Each sensor continuously reads data from a different input file, which can
be accessed by calls to the blocking transport method. Upon each sensor access,
the signal characteristics of the TLM extended payload are set. Despite of glitch
count, these signal characteristics follow a Gauss distribution. The values for
the mean and the standard deviation of the distributions can be set on sensor
instantiation. The initialization value of the geometric distribution for the glitch
count is equal the chance of no glitch occurrences in a bit. The statistical variable
glitch count is then calculated by framebits/xk.
3.1 Fallback Modes
In the bus master the fallback mode selection algorithm (fig. 4) can be activated.
The bus master gets the information about signal failure occurrences from the
bus instance. If the algorithm is activated and any failure occurs, a selected
fallback mode is assigned to the bus by the bus master. Directly after mode
change, a single transmission retry is carried out, for which neither fallback mode
nor further retries are activated. After this transmission is completed, fallback
modes can continue to be assigned.
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6 Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System
Bus  Bus
Master
CPU Sensor
Sensor
Fig. 3. Acquisition System Architecture
Fig. 4. Select algorithm for fallback mode
3.2 Results
During the simulation of the model all data is accepted by the acquisition CPU.
Faulty data is marked on simulation and counted, if faults are detected, infor-
mation about isolation or correction is logged, otherwise failure occurrence is
asserted. With this data, fault propagation analysis can be made, producing
statistics about the robustness of the model against the environment modelled
by the probability distributions.
An environment is defined in the table 2. Bus works with a 100kHz frequency
clock, sample phase of implementation 216◦, and TTL logic levels (bit 0: 0.8
V/bit 1: 2.0 V). For a simulation on this configuration the values of total system
faults (signal failures), fault isolation, fault recovery and failure occurrence are
compared for 2 modes: Fallback reset on/off. Its results are presented in table 3.
Mode fallback off does not isolate neither recover any fault, the same test for a
fallback off bus produces the same amount of failures as arisen faults. The signal
outputs of the data received by the CPU for a simulation with fallback turned
off and on can be seen on fig. 5.
Applying signal fault detection and adapting the bus operation mode accor-
denly, 97% of the faults generated by the faulty behavior described in table 2
could be recovered, the remaining 3% have occurred on the retry transmission
after fallback mode set. In this situation no further retry is activated.
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Signal Characteristic Mean Standard Deviation
High bit
3 0.35
Voltage Level
Low bit
0 0.3
Voltage level
Delay 4µs 1.2 µs
Rise time 2µs 0.1µs
Fall time 2µs 0.1µs
Glitch time 4µs 0.5µs
Glitch level 0.5 0.1
Table 2. Signal characteristic of sensor bus connection. Glitch count initialization
value is 0.8, that is 80% chance of glitch free bit
Number of Fallback reset ON Fallback reset ON
Transmissions 40000 40000
Transmission Retries 2833 6
Blocked Transmissions 457 39198
Faults 5516 8
Isolated Faults 239 4
Recovered Faults 5143 8
Failures 134 0
Table 3. Test results for fallback reset ON and OFF tests
Fig. 5. Testing signal faults on bus: left fallback modes off, right on
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8 Fault Propagation Analysis on TLM of an Acquisition System
4 Conclusion
The verification using classic hardware description languages evolves towards ap-
plying mixed signal verification to reduce uncertainty about the interoperability
between analog and digital systems. Faults in the different abstraction levels of
TLM have not been yet completely modelled. In this paper we have introduced
a mixed signal verification strategy for TLM models, which profits from early
verification of system design.
In order to process and analyze signal faults created in the system, we first
developed a signal fault model, based on standard signal quality characteristics.
Afterwards, an algorithm for detecting these faults based on operating properties
of the same bus was created. Similarly, the same bus processes the transmitting
data generating data failures according to the detected signal faults.
Then we inserted the developed bus in a TLM model of an acquisition system
to reason about fault propagation through a bus with fallback modes. Here a bus
master is implemented, which controls the bus, providing the bus with different
operation modes. Faults have not been directly injected in the system. Instead,
probability distributions have been assigned to the different signal characteris-
tics of the sensors, building the environment of the system, which statistically
generates faults.
The description of the signal characteristics of the sensors is realistic and
can be easily adapted to different conditions. The online adaptation of the op-
eration modes of the bus is able to isolate and correct almost every fault by
sacrificing performance. In a future work we plan to compare this results with
the fault tolerance of communication protocols with error correcting codes and
error detecting codes with retries.
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Abstract. In order to significantly reduce the number of safety-critical 
collisions of wheelchair users with objects spread in their environment, a study 
has been conducted which relates wheelchair user’s fine motor abilities with the 
collisions while driving through a standardized course in a realistic office 
environment. The conducted inferential statistics demonstrate that especially 
the participants’ aiming capacity can significantly predict the collisions 
occurring while driving through the course. A graphical and qualitative analysis 
of these effects demonstrates in addition that specific maneuvering tasks 
influence this relationship and that especially driving next to an object without 
colliding requires a high level of aiming capacity. The results demonstrate the 
need to develop a wheelchair system which adapts its assistive functionality to 
the aiming capacity and the difficulty of the maneuvering task in order to 
provide as much help as necessary without risking the degradation of the 
wheelchair user’s skills.  
Keywords: human-technology interaction, powered wheelchair control, fine 
motor abilities, adaptive automation systems 
1   Motivation and State of the Art 
The major goal of assistive technologies is to significantly ease the lives of those with 
sincere disabilities or serious impairments when executing activities of daily living. 
An example for such an assistive technology is an electrically powered wheelchair, 
which enables a mobility-impaired user to move freely and to a large degree 
independently. As a number of evaluations (see e.g., [1]; [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]) has 
demonstrated, this ambitious goal of easing the lives of those in need has not yet fully 
been achieved: While qualitative evaluations ([1]; [2]; [3]; [4]) demonstrated that 
long, tedious, and sometimes even unsuccessful training periods are required in order 
to use such an assistive device efficiently and effectively in everyday life; quantitative 
evaluations ([5]) showed that these (negative) effects can be traced back 1. to the 
number of input commands which are required in order to execute a given behavior, 
2. to the space necessary for realizing special maneuvering tasks, and 3. to the time it 
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takes to actually reach the desired goal position. These statistics are even more sincere 
considering the number of accidents of wheelchair users occurring, e.g. when driving 
backwards without noticing a staircase behind them going down.  
A number of wheelchair assistance systems have been developed in the past, 
which aim at improving today’s technology for example by providing intention 
estimation behaviors and implementing methods developed in the field of robotics in 
order to automate as much as possible of the steering task (see e.g., [6]; [7]; [8]). This 
approach of easing the lives of those in need by taking over a great amount of the 
physical and cognitive work to actually control the assistive device is, however, 
criticized by physicians and nurses. The latter promote the concept that the assistance 
should only de-burden the persons with disabilities from those tasks, which cannot be 
achieved in their current condition, as otherwise the remaining skills and abilities 
deteriorate. Hence, as much support as necessary should be provided, not as much 
support as possible. In order to realize this vision, the development of an adaptive 
wheelchair system has been promoted (see e.g., [9]), which actually recognizes the 
current ability level of its user, derives an appropriate assistance level and actually 
uses this assistance level to support the user with disabilities as much as necessary 
such that on the one hand the remaining skills do not deteriorate and on the other hand 
the lives of those in need are eased and enhanced.  
2   Problem Statement 
In order to be able to actually realize such an adaptive wheelchair system, the current 
state of the art lacks a linkage between the ability profile of a wheelchair user and the 
occurrence of safety-critical situations.   
3   Solution Approach 
In order to fill this gap, a study was conducted, which is thoroughly described in 
the following sections.  
3.1   Description of the Study 
In order to relate the ability profile of a wheelchair user with the occurrence of 
safety-critical situations, 23 wheelchair users were asked to drive through a 
standardized course in a realistic office environment (for a floor plan, see Fig. 1). 
Within this office environment, five goal positions were identified and the 
participants were asked to drive from one of these five goal positions to the next. 
With repetitions, 14 goals had to be reached (for a detailed description of the course, 
see [10]). These course sections were defined such that reaching them required the 
participants to execute for wheelchair users difficult but also typical behaviors (such 
as e.g., turning on the spot, see [11]).  
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The wheelchair which was used for data collection is a powered wheelchair from 
Otto Bock Healthcare GmbH (type B600), which is thoroughly described in [12]. This 
wheelchair was equipped  
- with a control PC, which was mounted underneath the seat of the 
wheelchair and used to record data (e.g. on the route taken during the 
course),  
- a touchscreen for human-machine communication, which was, however, 
switched off in this study,  
- a set of ultrasonic sensors, which can be used for realizing a collision 
avoidance behavior (see [12]) and which were also switched off, 
- and a head-mounted eye- and headtracking system, which can be used to 
realize a gaze-based intention estimation behavior [12]. 
While driving, it was recorded for each of the 14 sections of the course and the 
complete course, whether and how often the participants hit objects such as tables 
spread in the environment. In addition, the participants’ fine motor abilities were 
administered with the Motor Performance Test [13]. More specifically, data on the 
participants’ tremor, their aiming ability, their wrist-finger speed, and their arm-hand 
velocity was collected on a number of standardized fine motor tasks. In addition, the 
participants filled in a biographical questionnaire to control additional variance of the 
dependent measures. This data covered e.g. the participants’ gender, age, profession, 
experience in driving, etc.  
 
Fig. 1. Floor plan of the room in which the study took place – the crosses and the numbers 
inserted in the floor plan refer to the goal positions, which had to be reached by the participants.  
Before the participants drove through the course, they were given unlimited time 
to practice with the wheelchair in the same environment in which the course was set 
up. This procedure was taken in order to ensure that no skill acquisition effects 
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influenced the data, as the participants were healthy individuals and have never been 
sitting in a wheelchair before in their lives. It was decided to work with healthy 
individuals due to practical considerations. 
The sample consisted of 23 students of the Universities of Mannheim and 
Heidelberg (Germany). Most of them (n = 20) were Bachelor students of psychology; 
the minority were Master’s students (n = 3) of computer engineering. The sample’s 
average age was 23.1 years. 48% of the sample was male; 52% were female.  
3.2   Data Analyses  
After analyzing the descriptive statistics, inferential statistics were applied in 
order to relate the participants’ fine motor abilities with the number of collisions when 
driving through the 14 sections of the course.  
In a first step, univariate analyses of variance were conducted with the total 
number of collisions during the complete course as a dependent variable, the fine 
motor abilities of the participants as independent variables and variables such as the 
participants’ gender as control variables. The analyses testing the relationship 
between (1) the tremor, the precision, the arm-hand velocity and the hand-finger 
speed and (2) the number of collisions were not significant. Significant results (see 
Tab. 1) were, however, found for the relationship between the results of the aiming 
capacity test and the number of collisions during the complete course:  
- As Tab. 1 demonstrates, the time required to complete the aiming capacity 
task was a significant predictor (F(1, 2) = 4.56, p < 0.05, f² = 0.19) of the 
number of collisions caused while driving. As the reported statistics 
demonstrate, the effect is a large one according to the classification of Cohen 
[14]. As the positive correlation of r = 0.26 (p < 0.05) between the two 
variables demonstrates, the relationship is such that the greater the time 
required to complete the aiming capacity task, the more collisions occur.  
- The other independent variables (i.e. the number of mistakes, the number of 
hits, and the duration of mistakes when completing the aiming capacity task) 
do not have a significant impact on the dependent variable (p > .05).  
Table 1.  Results of the univariate analyses of variance 
Independent Variable Value of the test statistic F Probability p Effect size f² 
aiming – number of mistakes F(1, 20) = 0.04 0.71 0.01 
aiming – number of hits F(1, 18) = 2.41 0.14 0.12 
aiming – duration of mistakes F(1, 21) = 0.06 0.80 0.00 
aiming – total duration F(1, 20) = 4.56 0.04* 0.19 
* p < .05 
 
In a second step, general linear model analyses with repeated measurements were 
calculated using the number of collisions in each section as dependent variables, the 
fine motor abilities as independent, and variables describing additional information 
about the participants as control variables. In parallel to the results reported for the 
univariate analyses of variance, significant relationships were found mainly for the 
variables measured during the aiming capacity task. These significant effects are two-
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way interaction effects between the repeated measurement factor (i.e., the number of 
collisions per course section) and the aiming capacity measure (i.e., number of 
mistakes, number of hits, duration of mistakes, total duration). More specifically, the 
following significant effects (p < .05) have been found (see also Tab. 2): 
- The interaction between the repeated measurement effect and the number of 
hits explains a significant proportion of the dependent variable’s variance 
with F(13, 260) = 3.20 (p < .01). Following Cohen’s [14] convention, this 
effect size is large with f² = 0.14.  
- The interaction effect between the repeated measurement effect and the 
duration of mistakes is significant with F(13, 247) = 2.08 (p < .05). In 
contrast to the previous effect, this effect can be considered medium-sized 
[14].  
- Last, the interaction effect between repeated measurement effect and the 
total duration of the task is significant with F(13, 247) = 2.63 (p < .01). This 
effect is also a large effect (f² = 0.12). 
Table 2.  Results of the general linear model analyses 
Independent Variable Value of the test statistic F Probability p Effect size f² 
Aiming – number of mistakes F(13, 247) = 1.67 0.07 0.08 
Aiming – number of hits F(13, 260) = 3.20 0.00** 0.14 
Aiming – duration of mistakes F(13, 247) = 2.08 0.02* 0.10 
Aiming – total duration F(13, 247) = 2.63 0.00** 0.12 
* p < .05; * * p < .01. 
 
In order to further analyze these effects, line plots were generated which are 
displayed in Figure 2.  
These line plots first of all illustrate that the significant effects are mainly due to 
four sections of the course, which are Sections 2, 4, 7, and 14. These sections cover 
driving from Goal Position 4 to Goal Position 2; from Goal Position 5 to Goal 
Position 2; from Goal Position 3 to Goal Position 1 and from Goal Position 4 to Goal 
Position 1 (see Fig. 1). There is one criteria, which all of these course sections have in 
common, i.e., the goal position can only be reached if the participants drive next to an 
object: For Goal Position 2, the participants were asked to drive next to a cupboard 
such that they could withdraw a paper from it; for Goal Position 1 the participants 
were asked to drive next to a table. Hence, at least from this qualitative analysis of 
these course sections, it can be assumed that driving next to an object requires aiming 
capacity.  
Second, the relationship between the performance in the aiming capacity tasks 
and the collisions was analyzed on the basis of these line plots. As the line plots 
demonstrate, the persons with worse aiming capacity performance collided more often 
in a course section, if they collided, when compared to those with better aiming 
capacity performance. In addition, the participants with greater aiming capacity 
performance measures collided less often within one course section; however, their 
probability of colliding overall sections was increased.   
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Fig. 1. (a) Line plot showing the number of collisions overall 14 course sections for those 
participants with an optimal number of hits (drawn-through line) and a worse number of hits 
(dotted line). (b) Line plot showing the number of collisions overall 14 course sections for the 
participants with greater durations of the mistakes (dotted line) and lower durations of the 
mistakes (drawn-through line). (c) Line plot showing the number of collisions during the 14 
sections for those participants with a greater total duration of the aiming capacity task (drawn-
through line) and smaller total durations (dotted line).  
3   Discussion, Conclusions, and Future Work 
It was the goal of this paper to demonstrate the relationship between the 
occurrence of safety-critical situations (i.e., collisions) and the fine motor abilities of 
wheelchair users. For this purpose, a study has been conducted, which is described in 
this paper, during which participants drove through a standardized course. Their 
collisions with objects in the environment were measured, as was their fine motor 
abilities.  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Trials 1 - 14  Trials 1 - 14 
 Trials 1 - 14 
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The results of univariate analyses of variance and general linear model analyses 
demonstrate 1. a relationship especially between the aiming capacity performance 
measures of the participants and the number of collisions happening while driving 
through the complete course and 2. an interaction of this effect with the different 
sections of the course implying that there are maneuvering tasks, which require a 
higher level of aiming capacity than other maneuvering tasks. On the basis of 
graphical, qualitative analyses of line plots for participants with greater/lower aiming 
capacity performance measures and their collisions per course section, it was 
demonstrated that, on the one hand, participants with lower performance measures 
had an increased collision probability for some course sections requiring them 
especially to drive next to an object in their environment but a decreased collision 
probability for the complete course. On the other hand, the participants with greater 
aiming capacities collided less often during these risky sections, but had an increased 
risk of colliding during the complete course.   
These results show that it is actually necessary to adapt the assistive functionality 
of a powered wheelchair system to the fine motor abilities (and especially the aiming 
capacity) of their users to successfully decrease the number of collisions with objects 
spread in the environment and to adapt the assistive functionality to the degree of 
difficulty of special maneuvering tasks in everyday behavior. As a next step, a 
cognitive model will be developed and implemented, which allows a wheelchair 
system to assess the aiming capacity level of its user and to adapt its assistive 
functionality accordingly (for a description of the methodology therefore, see for 
example [15]. 
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Abstract. We present a novel approach to describe dependability measures for 
intelligent patient monitoring devices. The strategy is based on using a 
combination of methods from system theory and real-time physiological 
simulations. For the first time not only the technical device but also the patient 
is taken into consideration. Including the patient requires prediction of 
physiology which is achieved by a real-time physiological simulation in a 
continuous time domain, whereby one of the main ingredients is a temporal 
reasoning element. The quality of the reasoning is expressed by a dependability 
analysis strategy. Thereby, anomalies are expressed as differences between 
simulation and real world data. Deviations are detected for current and they are 
forecasted for future points in time and can express critical situations. By this 
method, patient specific differences in terms of physiological reactions are 
described, allowing early detection of critical states.  
Keywords: Physiological Simulation, Real-Time, Risk Assessment, Patient 
Specific Modeling, Dependability 
1. Introduction 
Physiological modeling and simulation are very useful for various purposes in the 
medical domain (e.g. medical education, medical training simulators, interventional 
planning and understanding of physiological phenomena therein; as well as for 
prognostic modeling). Due to the multidimensionality of the problem, normally the 
overall modeling is a complex task (>4000 variables for quantitative circulatory 
physiology (QCP) [1]). In addition there are substantial uncertainties in the modeling 
data. Due to computational complexity, many approaches only apply population 
models and thus restrict to statistical information. Applying individualized 
physiologically based models including metabolism and transportation for different 
organs and tissues, however, allows for individualized simulations. Compared with 
population model based simulations, these individualized approaches are thus 
expected exhibiting the same advantages as we see them when comparing 
physiological based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) [2] with population pharmacokinetic 
(PopPK) [3] approaches.  
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We provide a new hybrid approach by combining stochastic modeling with 
integrative system, which provides realistic, patient individual and real-time capable 
simulations of physiological reactions to induced events e.g. given by medication or 
interventions. We present a novel methodology how approaches from system theory 
and dependability analysis therein can be applied to use real-time physiological 
simulations for patient risk assessment based on standard monitoring of high 
frequency physiological vital parameter addressing intelligent monitoring systems in 
clinical workspace. 
 
2. State of the Art 
One can find various micro and macro models considering special physiological 
interactions in human body. The main strategy focuses on using integrative models 
formulated by systems of ordinary differential equations (ODE) [4]. By Physiome [5] 
and QCP [1] a substantial step towards a platform for overall physiological modeling 
was established. Additionally, by these platforms it was possible for combine 
different smaller models into overall physiological descriptions and a general 
modeling language is supported, which allows building model data bases. The 
disadvantages are the lack of supporting real-time simulation, overcome model 
complexity issues as well as uncertainty of model parameters.  
Thus, stochastic approaches are considered in our ap-proach as well. Especially 
dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN) [6] (as generalization of Markovian decision 
processes) are selected for medical simulations [7]. As shown earlier, the combination 
of integrative and stochastic approaches are well suited for real-time and realistic 
physiological simulations [8], and thus are essential as a basis for our risk assessment 
approaches.    
System dependability, considered as a mixture of availability, reliability, safety, 
confidentiality, integrity and maintainability [9], is, unfortunately, not defined 
uniquely in literature and often it is system and mission specific dealing with errors, 
faults and failures. For dynamic systems, dependability is formally specified by the 
description of system behavior, such that the system trajectory remains in a certain 
predefined region/boundary [10]. Due to the fact that human factor is an important 
part of a monitoring system [11], diverse approaches consider the human in the 
context of dependability analysis [12]. Yet, no approach considers the patient’s 
dependability additionally to technical systems so far. Even in the concrete field of 
patient monitoring, recent work on risk analysis only considers the system without 
patient [13]. We consider this as a systematic weakness, which we want to address 
and overcome with our new methodology by applying methods from systems theory 
in combination with dynamic simulations to provide a better and sophisticated way 
for risk assessment. The feasibility of our dependability strategy is demonstrated in a 
simulator environment extending a vital parameter monitoring system from the 
intensive care unit (ICU). 
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3. Methods 
3.1.  General Framework 
 
Fig. 1: System theoretical view: Event based real-time simulations have been used to simulate 
and predict the outcome of patient’s vital signals, which can be measured/observed. The 
differences in signal outcome of the real and simulated patients have been used to describe 
dependability measures and provide an extended monitoring system. 
Fig. 1 shows an extended patient monitoring represented in a system theoretic 
way. The upper part of the diagram shows real patient block, being a black box model 
and including some observable and non-observable internal states. This block 
describes the physiology (behavior) of the patient, in other words the patient’s health 
states, which could be multiparametric. According to system dynamics – subsequent 
patient states are correlated to earlier ones – a dynamic feedback loop is necessary. As 
mentioned before, we are unable to observe and measure all patient internal 
parameters, which is depicted by a patient observer block. In the lower part of the 
diagram a corresponding network is found, which is a description of the virtual 
model, being a simulation model of the real patient. This system is, again, composed 
of patient model block, a dynamic feedback, and an observer block. The patient model 
may be any mixture of time-invariant dynamic systems even containing non-
stationary probabilistic temporal models.  
If the virtual model is mimicking/simulating the real world perfectly, there will be 
no difference in both observations. A difference, however, is interpreted as error 
given by the simulation, which – as depicted in the intermediate layer – allows 
extending the monitoring by providing more knowledge about patient states and even 
extend to patient dependability and risk analysis. Normally, if the virtual patient 
model is accurate and well suited, the error is a significant sign for a deviation 
between real patient states and virtual patient states. Such a deviation may be 
interpreted as a deviation from safety boundaries and hints towards possible safety 
critical situations.  
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3.2. Physiological Simulation Framework 
As mentioned earlier, for the simulation engine a mixture of deterministic and 
probabilistic methods have been used, which provides better modeling capabilities 
especially by including stochastic causal influences, which can also have dynamic 
character. For this purpose, in addition to compartment models (Figure 2. left) DBNs 
(Figure 2. right) have been applied [16].  A DBN is a pair (G,P), where G is a directed 
acyclic graph which nodes correspond to a set of random variables x of a stochastic 
time dependent process X={Xt: t T}. P=P(X) is the joint probability distribution 
(JPD) of variables of the random process X. Essentially, G describes the dependency 
by how far a variable is conditional or unconditional to other variables, i.e. a 
representation for causal influences between variables. The strength of influence is 
given by the conditional probability distribution CPD, which can be described for 
discrete and continuous space. For discrete space, the CPD can be specified by a finite 
conditional probability table (CPT), which is not restricting the CPD to predefined 
distributions e.g. a Gaussian. The main aspect of BN/DBN is the probabilistic 
inference, i.e. if the probability of a certain variable/node – called evidence 
variable/node – is known to affect the conditional probability of other 
variables/nodes. Various algorithms exist for performing exact inference, mainly 
based on applying Bayesian rule and d-separation on the JPD. On the contrary, 
approximate inference additionally supports large BN/DBNs and additionally 
operates on incomplete evidence in the network. In case of DBNs, the inference of 
nodes of future temporal slices corresponds to the prediction of future outcome and is 
therefore called temporal reasoning.  
  
Fig. 1. Left: A 2-Compartment model. Right: The corresponding BN/DBN mixture containing 
static anchor nodes I1 and O2 from BN and two dynamic nodes C1, C2 from DBN.   
 
3.3.  Dependability and Risk Assessment Model 
In clinical monitoring, a patient observer (Fig. 1) analyzes and monitors patient’s 
vital parameters, especially heart rate, blood pressure, oxygen saturation. Usually, 
these parameters are defined in a signal space S. By definition, monitoring devices 
adjust alarms, when a parameter exceeds a certain limit or boundary in the signal 
space. This procedure induces a subspace ζ ≤ S, where the signal is representing a 
non-critical and safe state. If ζ is time invariant with regard to the system dynamics it 
represents a constant interval, which is well-known from given alarm boundaries of 
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patient monitoring devices. We define the window dependability of a signal trajectory 
as shown in Eq. (1). tw is describing the time window of interest and εζ2(t) is the 
squared error given by the Euclidian distance of the signal value and a given 
boundary ζ.  
0
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This formalism has two impacts; on the one hand the boundary ζ does not need to 
be a constant and on the other hand the integrative window shows how the boundary 
error is behaving over time. Additionally, dependability is defined with respect to a 
special mission [[9]]. In our case, stabilizing a patient’s health state by an intervention 
or a medication is describing exactly such a mission and corresponding mission 
trajectories. For such a case, we define the mission dependability as given in Eq. (2). 
tm is describing the mission time which is given by the time for an intervention or a 
medication. ε∂2(t) is the quadratic error, which is given by the Euclidian distance of 
the real signal value and the simulated virtual signal value.  
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Hereby, one focus is on the dependability during a certain event based mission 
(from a starting time t0 to an actual time t). The second focus lies on predicting 
dependability in future (from the actual time t to the prediction horizon tw). Thus, the 
formula consists of two parts; one error-formula for the past and one for the future. 
The error formula for the past can be interpreted on one hand as a measure for the 
quality of the simulation model. If the model is not simulating the real world 
accurately the error is large and the model is not well suited. By adding additional 
knowledge e.g. changing model parameters one adapts the model to the real world. 
This is either realized by user interaction or by applying multivariate optimization 
techniques. On the other hand if the model is designed well for healthy patients. The 
error term for the past is thus a good measure for the health state of a patient, taking 
time-variant information into account as well. Deviations to the health state is 
considered as reduced dependability like in system theory.   
In our architecture, as shown in Fig. 1, we assume that there is a model which 
simulates and predicts the dynamic time-invariant changes of a monitored signal. 
Generally, such models are rare, because one needs to know the trajectory of the 
system states as well as the environmental influences. Therefore, probabilistic models 
are typically used to allow prediction of future system (in our case patient) states. 
 
3.4.  Quality of Service 
According to our proposed architecture, it is possible to update the internal states 
of the dynamic system model by the knowledge of the real world observation. This 
process (which is called “smoothing” for probabilistic dynamic systems) will lead to 
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another prognosis for the next prognosis time window horizon tw [[13]]. Assuming 
that we can apply Nw updates on the patient model within the time window tw will 
result in a measure for the quality of the predictions for future outcome, as shown in 
Eq. (3). The quadratic error ε(i)∂2(t) is given by the Euclidian distance of the signal 
value and the predicted value ∂(i)(t) at time t for i=1..Nw model updates (smoothing) 
within in the prediction horizon. One has to consider that the entropy for probabilistic 
inference and thus the amount of uncertainty is increasing with the amount of 
reasoning steps Nw and the prediction time tw [[14]]. Generally, in our terms this will 
lead automatically to worst quality of service for the predictive model. 
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4. Results 
 
Fig. 2: Emulated vital parameter signals (ECG, IBP, SaO2) are detected by a monitoring 
system. An extended monitoring is supported due to the proposed methodology. Dependability 
and quality of service (QoS) are the major impacts of this method. 
Our system developed for real-time-physiological simulations is using a hybrid 
approach applying ODEs and DBN for simulation of physiological interactions [5]. It 
is based on a hierarchical model description such that basic models for circulatory can 
be connected with e.g. models for drug interaction or interventional models as well. 
This system has been used to show the feasibility of the suggested approaches in a 
central monitoring environment.  
We prepared a setup for a virtual ICU monitoring environment, as one can see in 
Fig. 3. A simulator dummy can simulate a real patient whose dynamics are 
represented by a set of models (e.g. circulatory system, medication, respiration 
defined in a XML model library) and patient specific parameters.  
A similar simulation model is running virtually on the central monitoring system, 
while here the model parameters could be others. The virtual model updates internal 
states due to real measurements, emulated by the simulator dummy. The model 
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prognosis is analyzed regarding quality of service as well as dependability aspects for 
risk assessment.  
In Fig. 4 we use a case study to show the feasibility of our methods on a 
medication with epinephrine, which is e.g used for the treatment of bardycardia. On 
the one hand a simulation (basic circulatory system in combination with simple 3-
compartment PBPK) is running to forecast a prognosis for the effects on the heart rate 
(HR), on the other hand a similar simulation is running on the physiological simulator 
dummy to simulate the vital parameter in real-time. The measured data are processed 
by a monitoring system and emulate real data, although they are not from real 
patients. The error between forecasted and real data is used to compute the 
dependability value for the HR, given by the induced medication event. In fact, the 
error here is due to different parameter (clearance factor) given by the patient 
physiological model.  
 
Fig. 3 Case Study: Effect of epinephrine on heart rate (HR) changes. One can see the forecasted 
HR due to the medication (Prognosis) and the real data extracted from the monitoring system. 
The error leads to a decreasing dependability value.  
5. Conclusion and Future work 
Applying dependability analysis on the human patient leads to interesting new 
methods for clinical monitoring. Physiological simulations are playing a key role in 
the proposed architecture, as far as they are addressed to take into account patient 
individual parameters as well as model updating and reasoning abilities. Once such 
models are available, the reasoning of events as medication or intervention for a 
specific patient based on the monitoring of vital parameter and other knowledge e.g. 
history, age and gender can be used for an individual risk assessment.  
A general framework to access the dependability of patient states without forcing 
fault-tree modeling or similar approaches known from the reliability/dependability 
analysis have been provided by our methodology. The dependability measure for 
future risk and past model differences is a new view on patient’s critical situations, 
which also considers dynamic attributes in addition to static ones, given by the well 
known alarm borders. Additionally the quality of service is a measure for the 
applicability of the virtual physiological model, which is currently in use.   
We are preparing in vivo experiments on rats to test our methodology for vital 
parameter monitoring based on dedicational injection, showing how such a system 
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can be used to develop better and more specific models for drug interactions and 
provide a proof for the suggested concepts. By now, the applicability in terms of 
modeling and computational feasibility has been demonstrated as shown in Figure 4.  
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Abstract. A nested monitoring, diagnosis and reconfiguration (MDR) scheme 
is proposed for a Recursive Nested Behavior based Control structure (RNBC) 
constituting a generic system architecture for (semi-) autonomous mobile 
systems. Each behavior layer within the RNBC structure is associated with a 
MDR schema, which is responsible to ensure the dependability of every single 
layer. An online dependability measurement and diagnosis procedure is 
integrated into monitor and diagnosis blocks under consideration of 
performance and safety acceptability factors. The reconfiguration blocks within 
the MDR-scheme switch from components with unacceptable behavior to 
redundant components, which may have degraded performance but more robust 
and safe behavior. The MDR blocks at each layer are nested through unified 
interfaces in order to utilize the distributed modeling of system behavior and to 
facilitate the system design and implementation process. In a small case study 
the MDR scheme is demonstrated for an assistant wheelchair on the body 
velocity control and axis velocity control levels. Simulation results show the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the approach. 
Keywords: Dependability, autonomous mobile systems, monitoring, diagnosis, 
reconfiguration. 
1   Introduction 
In (semi-) autonomous mobile applications, the primary objective to use fault 
detection and diagnosis (FDD) and fault tolerant control (FTC) techniques is to 
increase system dependability. A unified FDD/FTC framework that adapt to behavior-
based architecture is required to assist system development. Some research projects 
[1][2] have developed layered fault tolerant control architecture for behavior-based 
mobile systems. However, finding novel control structures and design methods which 
are better applicable to engineering applications are still important research questions 
in the field of fault tolerance [3][4]. 
This work proposes a nested monitoring, diagnosis and reconfiguration scheme, 
named as MDR scheme, which is designed for the Recursive Nested Behavior-based 
Control (RNBC) structure [5]. Fault modeling and dependability concepts are adapted 
from [6] and [7]. In contrast to binary fault modeling the dependability concept is 
based on the behavior description of the system and its components. Dependability 
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properties are related to the deviation of the actual system behavior from the desired 
behavior and to the distance of critical system states from safety boundaries. The 
desired behavior can be described in the form of a reference output signal (reference 
mission), which may be generated by a reference model in response of a system input 
trajectory. The deviation of the actual system output from the reference output is 
monitored by the corresponding monitoring component. If a state-space reference 
model is available, the monitoring component may be realized in form of a state 
observer, which estimates the internal system states besides the next predicted output 
value. The monitoring component outputs the deviation signals (residuals) and the 
distance of critical states from their limits. In case of black box modeling all critical 
states must be visible as external signals. The external signals will be fed to a 
diagnosis component, which assesses the acceptability of the retrieved value (s. 
example below). Depending on the result the system is reconfigured using a 
reconfiguration component. Here a hierarchical monitoring, diagnosis and 
reconfiguration (MDR) scheme is proposed.   
2   Proposed MDR Concept 
The MDR scheme is integrated in the Recursive Nested-Behavior-Based Control 
(RNBC) structure consisting of a number of layers, which are recursively connected 
to each other [5]. Each layer in the RNBC structure hosts a number of components 
and corresponding dynamic behaviors. The behaviors can be uniformly described as 
signals, which flow between the layers, regardless their type of implementations (e.g. 
hardware or software). A single MDR block ensemble is locally associated with a 
single behavior layer and responsible to keep the deviation from the specified 
behavior in an acceptable level.  
Figure 1 shows two behavior layers of the RNBC structure, each of which 
containing a MDR scheme besides the functional components. Monitor, diagnosis and 
reconfiguration are the three components under consideration. The working principle 
of them will be explained in the following, using an exemplary modeling approach, 
i.e. all layers are described as linear time-invariant systems with time-continuous 
dynamics. 
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Fig. 1. Monitoring (M) – Diagnosis (D) – Reconfiguration (R) scheme integrated into the 
RNBC structure, exemplary shown for two behavior layers 
2.1   Monitor Block and Diagnosis Block 
The aim of the monitor block is to calculate the behavior deviation and the safety 
margin. Inputs for monitor Mi are: measured (ui, yi) of the ith layer, lower monitor 
status information Ii-1, and reconfiguration information Ri to indicate the status of the 
reconfiguration process and therefore to update the current reference model. A 
reference model, e.g. using a transfer function, which describes the nominal behavior 
of the considered layer, is required. The model is used to determine, for a given input, 
the reference output yref. The instantaneous deviation from the reference behavior is 
given by the residual (see also Fig. 2)  
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The residual is a basic ingredient for a normalized performance acceptability function  
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yielding a value range [0, 1] and indicating, how acceptable the system’s 
(component’s) behavior is in comparison to a maximum allowed output deviation EP.  
The definition of a safety acceptability function is also based on a behavioral 
description. Therefore, the concept a dynamic safety margin [6][8] has been adopted. 
In [8] safety boundaries for a state space model and a dynamic safety margin, which 
is the minimum distance from these boundaries, have been defined. In contrast to the 
original definition, here, the safety boundaries are related to the output signal, which  
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Fig. 2. Safety boundary and dynamic system trajectory.  
 
 
is equivalent in the case of having all internal critical dynamic states available as 
system outputs. 
For the given input u(t), there is a range [ymin, ymax] for the output y(t), where the 
system is considered to be in a safe condition. Now let  
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be the distance to the safety boundary (fig. 2) and  
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            (4) 
the centre point of unsafe region at time t. Now, we can define the safety acceptability 
function 
 
)(
)(
tE
tdtA
S
s
S            (5) 
with  1,0)( tAS  reflecting the system (component) safety level with respect to the 
maximum possible distance to the safety boundary )()( tEty S . 
The total acceptability is the weighted sum of all acceptability terms 
                     )()()( tAatAatA SSPPTOT  ,                   (6) 
which is a function of time and which reflects the coincidence of the actual system 
behavior with the specified behavior. According to [6], the integration of the 
acceptability values over the system’s mission trajectory leads to a unique overall 
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dependability measure. In this paper the instantaneous total acceptability function is 
used to decide, if the system yields an acceptance level A* or not. If A < A*, a system 
reconfiguration is enabled. 
2.3   Reconfiguration Block 
There are basically two questions, which must be answered before a system 
reconfiguration can be performed: 1. What configuration should the system have after 
the reconfiguration, 2. How can the system be brought to the new configuration 
(especially how does the system behave during the transient phase). 
The question, what new configuration shall be used can be answered as follows:  
Offline Design: Each behavior layer contains a nominal components and 
redundant components. Both are designed and tested offline. E.g. the nominal 
component is designed to deliver better performance while the redundant component 
is simple, well understood, and more robust against faults. Thus, for each component 
the (average) acceptability value for a set of predefined typical mission trajectories 
can be measured during system test. During operation of the system the best 
component (with the highest acceptability level) is selected. The component (or even 
a complete layer) under consideration is replaced by switching if the acceptability 
level drops under the level of the next best component. It is required that all possible 
combinations of components behave stable. The offline design method proposed is in 
contrast to online design methods, where the complete system (structure and 
parameters) is rebuild according to the instantaneous system constraints.  
The second question cannot be answered so easily, if the system can be switched 
forward and switched back between different (at least two) configuration, since the 
system may behave unstable even in the case, when the single configuration 
themselves are stable. Therefore, we assume here one single transient from an 
undependable configuration to a new dependable configuration.  
Online Switching: By default, all nominal components are supposed to be 
“normal”. The switching is enabled only after the switching condition (enable signal 
from M&D blocks active) is fulfilled. When the reconfiguration is enabled, the 
reconfiguration block checks the configuration Ri from lower layers and it checks 
then the stability of the redundant component in the loop with the lower layers. When 
the stability condition is fulfilled the switching process will start. If the redundant 
component is already in operation and detected to be failed, the whole system will be 
brought in a fail-safe condition. 
3   Application of the MDR Concept to an Intelligent Wheelchair 
System 
In this section, a small application scenario is proposed illustrating the concept of the 
MDR scheme. Therefore, the three lower levels of a human-assisting “intelligent” 
wheelchair control system are considered.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the MDR scheme for the velocity controller in a wheelchair 
system. Layer L1 consists of the axes-level velocity controller, the actuators and some 
data processing blocks. Layer L2 contains the body velocity controller. It gets the 
reference velocity   2, refx   from layer L3, compares it with the measured velocity 
  2, mx   from gyroscops and encoders and generates a control signal, which is the 
reference velocity   1, refx   for next layer. In this example, the primary PID 
(proportional-integral-derivative) controller is used as nominal controller. The 
secondary PI controller has lower performance but is simpler and more reliable.   
The secondary component is running in parallel with the nominal component (hot 
standby). Thus an initialization period and a long term transient phase can be avoided.   
 
 
Fig. 3. Application example: Three lower layers of an intelligent wheelchair system 
 
Parameters of PID/PI controllers and MDR are given in Table 1. These parameters 
comply with manufacturer and empirical data so that future implementation can be 
made based on them. 
Table 1.  System parameters for the body velocity control level. 
Components Parameters Value 
PID Controller  
 
Kp,trans,Ki,trans,Kd,trans 
Kp,rot,Ki,rot,Kd,rot 
1.33, 1.11, 0.37 
1.6, 1.33, 0.53  
PI Controller Kp,trans,Ki,trans 
Kp,rot,Ki,rot 
1.0, 0.5 
1.2, 0.6 
MDR ES, EP 
aS, aP 
A* 
[6, 6] T, [5, 5]T
0.5, 0.5 
0.75 
 
Simulation results of the developed MDR mechanism using the model above are 
shown in Figure 4 a, b. A fault in layer L2 is emulated by injecting a 1 second output 
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delay in the nominal PID controller. Figure 4.a shows the L2 behavior in 3 cases. The 
Blue line corresponds to the faultless case, the red line denotes the faulty case without 
MDR scheme and the green line denotes faulty case with MDR scheme. Figure 4.b 
shows the time-dependent acceptability level during a mission of 100 seconds. As the 
desired acceptability level is 0.75, the behavior switching happens at t = 0. It can be 
observed that the MDR mechanism has recovered the behavior to an acceptable level 
by switching to the redundant component upon failure detection.  
 
Fig. 4 a. L2 translative velocity behavior in faultless, faulty (no reconfiguration)  
and faulty (with reconfiguration) cases 
 
Fig. 4 b. L2 acceptability level in faultless, faulty (without MDR) and faulty (with MDR) cases 
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4   Conclusions and Future Research 
In this paper, a monitor-diagnosis-reconfiguration scheme for autonomous and semi-
autonomous systems is proposed. A Model-based monitoring and multiple-controllers 
online switching approach is realized and demonstrated within a realistic simulation 
example. Dynamic behavior acceptability improvement as reconfiguration goal is 
carried out. As a single behavior, the body velocity controller of a wheelchair system, 
was integrated together MDR within the proposed architecture. The simulation results 
show the feasibility of the proposed MDR scheme in terms of keeping the behavior of 
components and system layers within an acceptable performance and safety. In future 
research, the MDR scheme will be implemented into a real-time control system.  
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Abstract. Incorporating safety in the software architectural design de-
cisions is important for the successful applications in safety-critical sys-
tems. However, most of the existing software design rationales do not
consider the quantitative aspect of the software architectures with re-
spect to safety. As a result, alternative architectures cannot be compared
adequately with respect to safety. In this paper, we present an analytical
approach for quantifying safety in software architectural designs. We use
the concept of architectural service routes to quantify system safety in
terms of software architectural attributes. We show how to make appro-
priate architectural design decisions based on their impacts on safety. We
compare different example architectures with respect to system safety.
Key words: Software architecture, architectural design decisions, and
system safety.
1 Introduction
Appropriate architectural design decisions are important for achieving quality
attributes in software intensive systems. These decisions are to be taken in the
early design stages and their impacts are carried out among the later develop-
ment stages. System safety is the absence of catastrophic consequences on the
system user(s) and the environment [1]. In safety-critical systems, failure types
differ with respect to their criticalities (catastrophic impacts) [5]. For exam-
ple, a traffic light system is highly critical to content failure (incorrect service),
where the traffic lights are green in all directions. On the other hand, it is less
critical to silent failures (service stopping), where all lights are turned off. An
aircraft control system is more critical to silent failures than a production line
control system’s criticality to the same failures. Unfortunately, safety has not
been sufficiently addressed at the software design level, and the quantitative im-
pacts of software architectures on safety have not been explicitly considered in
the existing software architectural design methodologies. As a result, existing
architectural strategies fail to sufficiently incorporate the rationale behind the
adoption of alternative architectural mechanisms with respect to their impacts
on system safety [13].
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Few techniques consider software architectural design decisions with respect
to their impacts on safety. These techniques mainly provide a set of requirements
to achieve system safety [13, 10, 3] or provide safety analysis mechanisms [5, 12].
Weihang Wu et al. [13] introduce some software architectural design tactics to
consider safety in software architectures. The approach extends existing software
architecture design tactics to consider system safety through the appropriate elic-
itation, organization, and documentation. Swarup et al. [10] propose a frame-
work for achieving system safety through system hazard analysis, completeness
of requirements, identification of software-related safety critical requirements,
safety-constraints based design, runtime issues management, and safety-critical
testing. Hill et al. [3] identify a number of safety requirements that must be pos-
sessed by a system or system component. These requirements are identifiability,
stability, completeness, clarity, validity, and feasibility. Leveson et al. [5] and
Tribble et al. [12] provide safety analysis based on architectural designs using
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) mechanism. FTA allows the detection of unsafe com-
putational states and consequently, it prevents safety critical failures. However,
current techniques disregard the quantitative evaluation of safety in software ar-
chitectures that can incorporate system safety through the appropriate selection
of the architectural design decisions.
In this paper, we present an analytical approach for quantifying safety of
software architectural designs. We evaluate system safety in terms of software
architectural attributes using the concept of Architectural service routes (ASRs)
[8]. The concept of Architectural service routes allows quantifying architectural
quality attributes by viewing a software architecture as a set of components and
a set of service routes connecting them. We provide an architectural design deci-
sion approach for selecting the appropriate architecture based on its impact on
safety. Finally, we compare three different example architectures based on their
impacts on safety. We use “Make To Order” manufacturing planning process in
our example architectures.
2 Preliminaries
Software architecture of a system is the structure, which comprises software com-
ponents, the externally visible properties of those components, and the relation-
ships among them [2]. A component is a unit of composition with contractually
specified interfaces, explicit context dependencies only, and no persistent state.
A component interface is a mean by which a component connects to another
component [11]. A component has one or more provided and/or required inter-
faces [9]. A component service is a facility that a component provides to, or
requires from other components as specified in the formal contracts with these
components. Software failures are classified from failure domain viewpoint as
content, silent, early service delivery, performance, halt, and erratic failures. [1,
6]. We denote the set of all failure types by T . Failure criticality is the estimated
degree of catastrophic impact by the failure occurrence.
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Fig. 1. Architectural service routes of an example architecture
An ASR is a sequence of components that are connected using “provided”
or “required” interfaces [8]. Fig. 1 shows some ASRs of an example architec-
ture in UML 2.0. Component 2 provides service to component 3. Component 3,
on the other hand, provides services to both components 4 and 5. Therefore,
component 2 provides its service to components 4 and 5 indirectly through com-
ponent 3. In the bottom part of Fig. 1, we show two example ASRs between
components 1 and 7 of the provided component diagram. The sequences of com-
ponents are (1, 2, 3, 5, 7) and (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7) for the left and the right ASR, re-
spectively.
Any two components x and y can have 0 or more ASRs. In Fig. 1, com-
ponents 4 and 5 have 0 ASR, components 2 and 6 have 1 ASR: (2,3,4,6), and
components 3 and 7 have 2 ASRs: (3,4,6,7) and (3,5,7). We refer to the set of
ASRs from x to y as Ψxy, and we denote an ASR in this set as ψxyk , where k is
the index of the k-th ASR in Ψxy. The length of an ASR ψxyk (referred as L
xy
k ) is
the number of components in it. In Fig. 1, L2,61 = 4, L
3,5
1 = 2, and L
4,5
1 = 0. |Ψxy|
denotes the number of ASRs from component x to component y e.g., |Ψ3,6| = 1
and |Ψ3,7| = 2.
3 Evaluating system safety
To derive system safety in terms of architectural attributes, we exploit the results
of the failure propagation analysis using ASRs [8]. Failure propagation indicates
the probability that a failure propagates through system components. The quan-
titative evaluation, parameters, and assumptions are described in the rest of this
section.
From the combinatorial viewpoint, system safety is the non-occurrence prob-
ability of failures that can lead to a mishap or hazard, whether or not the in-
tended function is performed [4]. Therefore, system safety S is expressed as∏
f∈T (1 − λfpf ), where pf is the probability of occurrence of system failure f ,
and λf is the criticality of failure f [7]. Failure criticality can be estimated based
on expert opinion or design documents.
By considering failure propagation in software architectures, a system failure
occurs when a component failure is propagated along an ASR to one of the output
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interface components. Given that, we can rewrite the safety equation as follows,
S =
∏I
i=1
∏
f∈T (1 − λfpfi ), where I is the number of system output interface
components, and pfi is the probability of occurrence of failure f ∈ T at the
system output interface component i. We can also replace pfi by
∑J
j=1 p
f
jP
f
ji,
where J is the number of system components, pfj is the failure probability of
component j, and P fji is the probability of failure propagation from component
j to interface component i. I.e.,
S =
I∏
i=1
∏
f∈T
(1− λf
J∑
j=1
pfjP
f
ji) (1)
Eq. 1 evaluates system safety based on failure propagation and failure crit-
icality. Failure propagation from any component j to interface component i is
calculated in [8] as follows.
P fji =
|Ψji|∑
k=1
β2L
ji
k |T | (2)
where β is a any value from 0 to 1, which expresses component failure proba-
bilities of system components. |T | is the number of failure types considered in the
evaluation. (e.g., |T | = 3 to consider content, silent, and performance failures).
By substituting from Eq. 2 into Eq. 1, we get the system safety as follows.
S =
I∏
i=1
∏
f∈T
1− λf J∑
j=1
pfj |Ψ
ji|∑
k=1
β2L
ji
k |T |
 (3)
Eq. 3 shows system safety in terms of the software architectural attributes
and failure criticalities.
4 Architectural design decision for incorporating safety
Software designers of safety critical systems often need to select an architecture
from a set of alternative architectures based on their impacts on safety. The
propagation of safety-critical failures among these architectures directly impacts
system safety based on the ASR attributes as shown in the previous sections.
In this section, we show how to consider the quantitative evaluation of system
safety in the architectural design decisions.
We provide an algorithm for evaluating system safety and selecting the ap-
propriate architecture based on the ASR attributes among system components.
Algorithm 1 provides one of the following decisions to choose between the two ar-
chitectures A and A′. SELECT-A indicates that architecture A is selected, while
SELECT-A′ represents the selection of architecture of A′. SELECT-EITHER
means that both architectures have equal impact on system safety.
The algorithm allows considering specific failure types in the architectural
design decision (Line 1). For example, by considering only content failures, the
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Algorithm 1 Architectural design decision based on safety
Input: Architectural attribute values.
Output: Selected architecture.
01. Identify the set of failure types T for comparing A and A′
02. Identify the failure criticality λf for each f ∈ T
03. FOR each component j of architecture A DO
04. FOR each output interface component i of A DO
05. Identify the set of ASRs between j and i;
06. END FOR
07. END FOR
08. FOR each component j′ of architecture A′ DO
09. FOR each output interface component i′ of A′ DO
10. Identify the set of ASRs between j′ and i′;
11. END FOR
12. END FOR
13. Calculate safety for architecture A and A′ using Eq. 3;
14. IF (safety of A > safety of A′) THEN RETURN SELECT-A;
15. IF (safety of A < safety of A′) THEN RETURN SELECT-A′;
16. IF (safety of A = safety of A′) THEN RETURN SELECT-EITHER;
approach will compare software architectures based on data corruption among
their component interactions. By considering early service delivery and late ser-
vice delivery failures, the architectures will be compared based on their perfor-
mances. Algorithm 1 selects the architecture that has the higher safety value
quantitatively. In Line 2, the failure criticalities are identified for the failure
types in the set T . These failure criticalities can be identified based on expert
opinion or design documents. Lines 03-07 calculate the failure propagation prob-
abilities between each pair of components for architectures A. Similarly, Lines
08-12 calculate the failure propagation probabilities for architectures A′. Line 13
calculates the safety of architecture A and A′. Based on the quantified safety of
A and A′, Lines 14-16 select the architecture with the higher safety.
5 Case study: comparing safety of example architectures
We use the example of the “Make To Order” (MTO) production planning pro-
cess of manufacturing systems to explain the proposed technique for comparing
different architectures. In MTO, products are manufactured after a confirmed
sales order is received for them. We present three different example architectures
for this process in Fig. 2. We evaluate the safety of these architectures based on
their ASR attributes. Each of the architectures in Fig. 2 uses 7 components,
numbered from 1 to 7. Component 1 is an input interface component, in which
the user inputs the production planning intervals. It passes the planning intervals
to three other components (sales, inventory, and purchase orders) after check-
ing the manufacturing schedule according to the calendar. Component 2 and
component 3 deliver the corresponding sales orders and item inventory to the
production and inventory planning component 5. Component 4 delivers the pur-
chase orders to the purchase planning component 6. Component 5 also delivers
the planned inventory requirements to component 6. Finally, both component 5
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and component 6 deliver their outputs to component 7 to create inventory out-
bound, purchase orders, and planned production orders.
The three architectures differ slightly in the interface with respect to the
shaded components. Unlike Fig. 2(a), Fig. 2(b) does not have a connector be-
tween components 5 and 6. Fig. 2(c) differs from Fig. 2(a) in that the connector
between components 4 and 6 is removed, and another connector between compo-
nents 4 and 5 is added. Regardless of the functional advantages or disadvantages
of these changes, we study these three architectures to see their impacts on the
overall system safety. We consider three failures (content, silent, and perfor-
mance failures), i.e., |T | = 3. In the computation of safety, we assume β = 0.7,
since smaller values may result in more approximations and less preciseness. For
simplicity, we choose pfj = 0.001 for all components and λ
f = 0.5 for all types
of failures. We use Eq. 3 to obtain the system safety.
(a) Architecture 1 (Arch. 1) (b) Architecture 2 (Arch. 2)
(c) Architecture 3 (Arch. 3)
Fig. 2.Different example architectures of “Make To Order” production planning.
Here, we show how to obtain the ASR attributes using Arch. 1 as an exam-
ple. We also show how to use these attributes to calculate system safety. Since
component 1 is an input interface component and component 7 is an output
interface component, there is no interface connection from any component to
component 1 or from component 7 to any other component.
Table 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c correspond to Arch 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In each
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table, rows represent component numbers from 1 to 6 and columns represent
component numbers from 2 to 7. The table cells represent the ASR attributes
among components in the form (N1xM1, N2xM2,...), where NixMi means: there
exist Ni ASRs of length Mi. For example, a cell (row= 1, column= 5) of Arch. 1
has the value 2x3 since Ψ1,5 = 2 and both L1,51 , L
1,5
2 = 3. Similarly, cell (row= 1,
column= 7) of Arch. 1 represents Ψ1,7 and has the value of 3x4, 2x5. Ψ1,7 in-
cludes 5 ASRs as follows, Ψ1,7 = {(1, 2, 5, 7), (1, 3, 5, 7), (1, 4, 6, 7), (1, 2, 5, 6, 7),
and (1, 3, 5, 6, 7)} for {ψ1,71 , ψ1,72 , ψ1,73 , ψ1,74 , and ψ1,75 }, respectively. The lengths
of the ASRs are 4, 4, 4, 5, and 5, respectively. By considering the ASR attributes
in Table 1 and the previously mentioned values of pfj , β, λ
f , and |T | in Eq. 3,
we get, S = 0.998887872 for Arch. 1 where S ∈ [0, 1].
2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1x2 1x2 1x2 2x3 1x3,2x4 3x4,2x5
2 0 0 0 1x2 1x3 1x3,1x4
3 0 0 0 1x2 1x3 1x3,1x4
4 0 0 0 0 1x2 1x3
5 0 0 0 0 1x2 1x2,1x3
6 0 0 0 0 0 1x2
(a) Arch. 1
2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1x2 1x2 1x2 2x3 1x3 3x4
2 0 0 0 1x2 0 1x3
3 0 0 0 1x2 0 1x3
4 0 0 0 0 1x2 1x3
5 0 0 0 0 0 1x2
6 0 0 0 0 0 1x2
(b) Arch. 2
2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1x2 1x2 1x2 3x3 3x4 3x4,3x5
2 0 0 0 1x2 1x3 1x3,1x4
3 0 0 0 1x2 1x3 1x3,1x4
4 0 0 0 1x2 1x3 1x3,1x4
5 0 0 0 0 1x2 1x2,1x3
6 0 0 0 0 0 1x2
(c) Arch. 3
Table 1: ASR attributes of architecture 1, 2, and 3.
Similarly, based on the ASR attributes of Arch. 2 provided in Table 1, the
system safety for Arch. 2 is 0.998908816. Comparing the safety values of Arch. 2
and Arch. 1, we can conclude that the Arch. 2 is safer than Arch. 1. This safety
gain in Arch. 2 is due to the decrease in the number of ASRs from the sys-
tem components in general to the output interface component. For example,
|Ψ1,7| = 3 in Arch. 2, while |Ψ1,7| = 5 in Arch. 1. The decrease in the number of
ASRs between two components decreases the propagation probabilities and con-
sequently increases the system safety. In Arch. 3, we have increased the number
of ASRs (e.g., |Ψ1,7| = 6 instead of 5 for Arch. 1) and the lengths of the shortest
ASRs (e.g., L4,6S = 2 instead of 1 for Arch. 1). According to our analysis, these
changes should decrease the system safety.
Based on the ASR attributes of Arch. 3 shown in Table 1, the safety is cal-
culated as S = 0.998887773. Comparing Arch. 3 and Arch. 1, the safety is lower
for Arch. 3. The lower safety in Arch. 3 is due to the increase in the number of
ASRs among system components. Comparing Arch. 3 and Arch. 2, the safety is
lower for Arch. 3. This loss of safety is also due to the increase in the number of
ASRs among system components.
6 Summary and future work
Safety has not been sufficiently addressed and the quantitative impacts of soft-
ware architectures on this quality attribute have not been explicitly considered
in the existing software architectural design methodologies. As a result, exist-
ing architectural strategies fail to sufficiently identify the rationale behind the
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adoption of alternative architectural mechanisms with respect to safety. In this
paper, we present an analytical approach for quantifying safety in software ar-
chitectural designs. We evaluate system safety in terms of software architectural
attributes using the concept of ASRs. Finally, we provide an architectural de-
sign decision approach for selecting the appropriate architecture based on their
impacts on safety-critical failure propagation among system components. The
main contribution of this work is to provide a quantitative evaluation of system
safety based on software architecture in an early design stage of software system
development. In our future work, we plan to estimate the criticality of a compo-
nent based on its location and connectivity in an architecture. This will help to
identify the components that are critical to system safety.
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Abstract. While the impact of “human error” on failures of complex human-
technology systems has widely been demonstrated and accepted, the relevance 
of situational and task-related characteristics on human performance has not yet 
been considered sufficiently. For this purpose and on the example of electrically 
powered wheelchair control this paper analyzes the effects of situational 
characteristics (e.g., turns to the left/right in the backward/forward driving 
mode) on the impact of fine motor abilities on human performance. A study 
with 23 participants is described in the paper, during which relevant data such 
as the subjects’ precision and aiming capacity, the number of collisions caused 
while driving as an indicator for human performance, and the situational 
characteristics were measured. The data analyses demonstrate an influence of 
especially the number of turns driven to the right in the backward mode on the 
impact of the precision ability on the number of safety-critical collisions. The 
results highlight the necessity not only to develop a wheelchair system which is 
adaptable to the user’s fine motor abilities, but also to the situational 
characteristics in order to increase the dependability of the human-technology 
system at hand.  
Keywords: human-technology interaction, powered wheelchair control, fine 
motor abilities, adaptive automation systems, situational characteristics 
1   Motivation and State of the Art 
Statistics and analyses of failures of human-technology systems demonstrate the 
impact and most importantly the exponential rise of the so-called human error, 
classically categorized as either an error of commission or an error of omission. 
According to Hollnagel [1], the human operator contributed to about 20% of system 
errors in 1960. In 1990, this same percentage has risen up to 90% (cf. [2]). A number 
of reasons are discussed in the literature – covering the increasing complexity of the 
technical systems and the resulting incapability of the human operator to maintain a 
high level of situation/mode awareness, incorrect mental models of the technical 
system at hand, a loss of manual skills, etc. (cf. [3], [4], [5]). 
In order to improve these statistics, the field of human reliability analyses has 
emerged, which first generation methods (e.g., Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction, THERP, [6]) aimed (1) at functionally decomposing human tasks, (2) at 
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identifying performance shaping factors (e.g., cognitive abilities, fatigue, illness, 
experience/qualification, weather conditions, automation design), which are expected 
to impact the implementation of these (human) tasks, and (3) at mathematically 
combining this information to yield a probability number reflecting the likelihood of a 
human error in advance. The second generation methods criticized these first 
generation methods due to their roots in the field of probabilistic risk assessment, 
which ignored the cognitive characteristics of the human operator (cf. [7]). An 
example for a second generation method is the Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) ([7]), which is based on a cognitive model of human performance. 
Due to this theoretical foundation, the method can either be used post hoc for accident 
analyses, but also for a priori performance predictions, which allow developing 
reasoning algorithms impeding the human error by replacing the human function with 
appropriate automation.  
2   Problem Formulation 
While already the term human error implies that the human being itself plays a 
major role, it is often not considered sufficiently that human behavior is a function of 
the person and his/her environment. This is reflected in the, in the meantime, well-
established behavior equation of Kurt Lewin [8]. While the “person-component” and 
its impact has been tested in the field of human-technology interaction (cf. [9]), the 
relevance especially of task and situational characteristics on the relationship between 
human characteristics and performance will be analyzed in this paper on the example 
of a safety-critical system, i.e., an electrically powered wheelchair for people with 
severe disabilities.  
3   Solution Approach 
In order to provide evidence for the impact of task and situational characteristics 
on the influence of human abilities on their performance, a study has been conducted, 
which is in the following thoroughly described and discussed.  
3.1   Description of the Course of the Study 
In order to collect data on the occurrence of safety-critical collisions, the study’s 
participants were first asked to drive through a standardized course with 14 sections in 
a realistic office environment. Therefore, an electrically powered wheelchair was 
used, which is commercially available from the company Otto Bock Healthcare 
GmbH (type B600). This wheelchair has been equipped with additional hard- and 
software in order to be able to record the required data, but also to provide additional 
assistive functionality such as collision avoidance, which has, however, for this study 
been switched off. The wheelchair, as it was applied here, has thoroughly been 
described in [10]. While driving data such as the route or the time required for 
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reaching a defined goal position as well as the number of caused collisions, were 
recorded. 
 The course, which the participants had to drive through, was designed such 
that a number of supposedly critical behaviors (e.g., turning on the spot; driving 
around corners) were evoked in order to be able to relate such task/situational 
characteristics with human abilities and their performance.  
In a second step, the participants’ fine motor abilities were diagnosed with 
the “Motor Performance Test” of Neuwirth and Benesch [11], which is necessary in 
order to answer the stated research question.  
Last, the participants were asked to fill in a biographical questionnaire 
assessing data for example on the age of the participants, their gender, field of study, 
etc.   
3.2  Description of the Sample  
Out of practical considerations, the convenience sample consisted of 23 students of 
the Universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim (Germany). The students were not 
disabled. In order to be able to control e.g. skill acquisition effects, the participants 
had unlimited time available to practice maneuvering with the wheelchair in the 
environment, in which the actual data recording took place.  
 The majority of the participants were Bachelor students enrolled in 
psychology (n = 20), while n = 3 were Master students in computer engineering. In 
addition, 12 participants were female, 11 were male.  
3.3  Data Analyses 
In order to relate the characteristics of each course section with the number of 
collisions and the participants’ fine motor abilities, we first of all identified the critical 
situational characteristics of the course by counting especially the number of turns 
which needed to be driven in the forward mode to the right and to the left, the number 
of times, a participant had to drive straight backward, the number of times, the 
participant had to drive a turn to the right/left in the backward mode and the number 
of times the participant had to turn on the sport to the right and to the left. In order to 
demonstrate that there were no sincere dependencies between these variables, their 
correlations were calculated (see Tab. 1). 
As Tab. 1 shows, these correlations vary between r = 0.339 (p > 0.05) and r 
= -0.552 (p < 0.05). The latter correlation is the only one, which has reached an 
acceptable level of significance and reflects the fact that, if a course section contained 
turns to the right (to be driven in the forward mode), less turns to the left (also to be 
driven in the forward mode) had to be made in order to achieve the current goal 
position. Hence, despite this correlation, there were no significant relationships 
between the different task characteristics in the course.  
 In a second step, inferential statistics were applied in order to test whether 
these situational characteristics have an influence on the relationship between the 
impact of the fine motor abilities on the number of collisions caused while driving. 
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For these purpose, we calculated univariate analyses of variance with the described 
situational characteristics as independent variables. As dependent variable, we used 
the impact of (1) the precision ability and (2) the aiming capacity on the number of 
collisions (see also [12], [13]). This impact can statistically be described as an effect 
size [14]. The results of the univariate analyses of variance regarding the precision 
ability are summarized in Tab. 2.  
Table 1.  Correlations between the task and situational characteristics of the course 
 Number 
of turns 
to the 
right, 
forward 
mode 
Number 
of turns 
to the 
left, 
forward 
mode 
Backward, 
straight 
ahead 
Number of 
turns to 
the right, 
backward 
mode 
Number of 
turns to 
the left, 
backward 
mode 
Turning 
on the 
spot to 
the right 
Turning 
on the 
spot to 
the left 
Number of 
turns to the 
right, 
forward 
mode 
-       
Number of 
turns to the 
left, 
forward 
mode 
-0.552* -      
Backward, 
straight 
ahead 
0.077 -0.439 -     
Number of 
turns to the 
right, 
backward 
mode 
-0.372 0.025 0.240 -    
Number of 
turns to the 
left, 
backward 
mode 
-0.025 -0.322 0.240 -0.077 -   
Turning on 
the spot to 
the right 
0.057 0.339 -0.228 -0.439 -0.439 -  
Turning on 
the spot to 
the left 
-0.025 0.025 0.240 -0.077 -0.077 -0.439 - 
* p < 0.05 
 
As Tab. 2 demonstrates, there is a highly significant effect (F(1, 12) = 
103,14, p = 0.00, f² = 0.90) of the number of turns to the right driven in the backward 
mode on the impact of the precision ability on the number of collisions caused while 
driving. To visualize this effect, a line plot is displayed in Fig. 1, which shows that the 
International Workshop on 
the Design of Dependable Critical Systems 
September 15, 2009, Hamburg, Germany 
 
79
greater the number of turns driven to the right in the backward mode, the greater the 
relationship between the number of caused collisions and the precision ability.  
Table 2.  Results of the univariate analyses of variance with the relationship between the 
precision ability and the number of collisions as a dependent variable 
Independent Variable Value of the test statistic F Probability p Effect size f² 
Number of turns to the 
right, forward mode 
F(1, 12) = 0.95 0.38 0.07 
Number of turns to the 
left, forward mode 
F(1, 12) = 0.08 0.79 0.01 
Number of times driven 
backward, straight ahead 
F(1, 12) = 0.21 0.66 0.02 
Number of turns to the 
right, backward mode 
F(1, 12) = 103.14 0.00** 0.90 
Number of turns to the 
left, backward mode 
F(1, 12) = 0.12 0.74 0.01 
Turning to the right on 
the spot 
F(1, 12) = 1.89 0.19 0.14 
Turning to the left on the 
spot 
F(1, 12) = 0.12 0.74 0.01 
** p < 0.01 
 
   
 
Fig. 1. Line plot of the relationship between the effect of the precision ability on the number of collisions 
while driving through the course and the number of turns to the right.  
 In a next step, we analyzed the impact of the situational characteristics of the 
course sections on the relationship of the aiming capacity and the number of 
collisions. Again, we calculated univariate analyses of variance with the situational 
characteristics as independent measures and the relationship (i.e., the effect sizes) 
between the aiming capacity and the caused collisions as a dependent variable. The 
results are given in Tab. 3.  
Number of turns to the right (backward mode) 
Relationship 
between the 
precision ability 
and the number 
of collisions 
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As Tab. 3 demonstrates and in contrast to the results introduced before, no 
significant effects with p < 0.05 have been found. Hence, at least these results give the 
impression that the chosen situational characteristics do not influence the impact of 
the aiming capacity on the number of collisions. However, it is to be considered that 
the sample size was relatively small. As the effect sizes, which are also displayed in 
Tab. 3, demonstrate, there are effects, which partially have reached a medium-size 
according to Cohen [14]. Due to the low power of the study at hand, these effect sizes 
might not have reached an appropriate level of significance.  
Table 3.  Results of the univariate analyses of variance with the relationship between the 
aiming capacity and the number of collisions as a dependent variable 
Independent Variable Value of the test statistic F Probability p Effect size f² 
Number of turns to the 
right, forward mode 
F(1, 12) = 1.47 0.25 0.11 
Number of turns to the left, 
forward mode 
F(1, 12) = 1.31 0.28 0.10 
Number of times driven 
backward, straight ahead 
F(1, 12) = 0.92 0.36 0.07 
Number of turns to the 
right, backward mode 
F(1, 12) = 0.03 0.87 0.00 
Number of turns to the left, 
backward mode 
F(1, 12) = 0.11 0.75 0.01 
Turning to the right on the 
spot 
F(1, 12) = 0.44 0.52 0.04 
Turning to the left on the 
spot 
F(1, 12) = 0.11 0.75 0.01 
4   Discussion, Conclusions, and Future Work 
Summarizing, this paper introduces the necessity to consider not only the 
characteristics of the human operator/user, but also task- and situation-related factors, 
which influence the relationship between the human operator and his/her 
performance. In order to demonstrate this relationship, a study has been conducted, 
during which participants drove through a course with an electrically powered 
wheelchair being one example of a safety-critical system. The course was defined 
such that a number of presumably critical situations occurred. The participants’ 
collisions with objects in the environment were measured. In addition, the 
participants’ fine motor skills were administered. In order to answer the stated 
research question, inferential statistics with the resulting data set were applied. More 
specifically, univariate analyses of variance demonstrated that the characteristics of 
the course sections impact the relationship between the precision ability and the 
number of collisions while driving: The turns which needed to be driven in a 
backward mode to the right side require a higher level of precision in order to avoid 
collisions when compared to turns which need to be driven to the left. Other effects 
have not reached an appropriate level of significance. This could be due to the low 
sample size, the inexistence of this effect or a high correlation between the situational 
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characteristics. However, the latter reason can be rejected, as the analysis of the 
correlational patterns has shown that only minor relationships existed between the 
occurrences of situational characteristics.  
In a next step, it will be aimed at collecting additional data in order to check 
whether the in this study insignificant medium-sized effects actually exist. In the long 
run, methods will be developed, which enable a complex computer system to judge on 
the complexity of a future action and change its level of autonomy accordingly, such 
that the dependability of safety-critical human-technology systems increases.  
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Safety critical computer systems such as control systems for automobile, aircraft, 
medical and intelligent mobile robots, are rapidly growing in complexity. This 
increasing complexity has made system monitoring an inevitable component of 
system operations and the subject of intensive study in the past few years. Several 
methods are used to deal with hybrid systems monitoring, which are based on multi-
model numerical filters, such as the Kalman filter [1] or particle filtering methods [2], 
[3]. Other approaches are based on automata [4] or on Bayesian nets [5] linked to 
some numerical evolution models. The only existing monitoring approach based on 
Particle Petri net was used for the analysis of flight procedures and deals with 
situation monitoring [6]. We consider a general, nonlinear, distributed, complex 
system with hybrid (discrete/continuous) behavior, for which a monitor has to be 
designed. Such systems present significant challenges for monitoring and diagnosis. 
For a large number of states and highly nonlinear equations, the design of a monitor is 
clearly problematic.  
 
Our approach gives a solution to reduce the design complexity by decomposing 
such a system using separate monitors for each subsystem. In this context, we have 
proposed a model of hierarchical hybrid monitoring for systems with so called 
“Recursive Nested Behavior Control” (RNBC) structure, which has been successfully 
employed for autonomous mobile robots [7], [8]. Since the system architecture is 
nested, the monitoring system is built using a nested structure. In this scheme, the 
monitors of a subsystem work independently using recursively the results of the 
monitors of the lover levels. The monitoring concept of the RNBC is shown in Fig.1. 
 
The hybrid state estimation is performed using a particle Petri net [9] model. It 
allows the representation of the discrete dynamics of the system through the Petri net 
structure and the modeling of the continuous behavior by evolution equations. The 
estimator is based on the particle filtering principle and computes the expected 
markings of the particle Petri net. From the estimation of the marking of the Petri net 
inconsistent behaviors can be detected. The consistency is checked with respect to the 
reachable markings of the Petri net. 
 
This work addresses the challenge of the interaction between continuous and 
discrete dynamics for the monitoring of autonomous systems with nested structure. 
The novelty of the framework is the use of the Particle Petri net for the monitoring of 
systems with a Recursive Nested control structure and the methodology for detecting 
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discrepancies between the expected and the actual behaviour of the system in such 
structure. The nested hybrid estimation methodology has been demonstrated on a 
heating control system example. The simulation results show the feasibility of the 
proposed design. 
 
Figure 1. Monitoring structure. 
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Abstract.  
In this paper a system design approach is proposed, which is based on a user needs 
assessment and a flexible and adaptable architecture for dependable system integration. The 
feasibility of the approach is shown on the example of an assistance system for electrically 
powered wheelchairs. The system requirements correspond to the cognitive and motor abilities 
of the wheelchair users. For the wheelchair system built up based on a commercial powered 
wheelchair several behaviors have been realized such as collision avoidance, local navigation 
and path planning well known from robotic systems, which are enhanced by human-interfacing 
components. Furthermore, the system design will be highlighted which is based on robotic 
systems engineering. Due to the fundamental properties of the system architecture the resulting 
assistance system is inherently dependable, flexible, and adaptable. Corresponding to the 
current situation and the users’ abilities the system changes the level of assistance during real-
time operation. The resulting system behavior is evaluated using system performance and 
usability tests.   
 Keywords: dependability, system design, user needs assessment, requirement 
analysis, use cases, system architecture, evaluation 
1   Introduction: Motivation, State of the Art, and Research 
Question 
According to a survey of the University of Berkley, California, published in 2002 
the number of computing systems used in everyday life is expected to grow at a 
percentage rate of 38% per annum. At the same time, the degree of complexity of 
these computing systems is increasing. Some specialists even warn [1] about this 
“nightmare of pervasive computing” due to the inability of the system designers to 
anticipate, design, and maintain such complex systems interacting with each other 
which can result in catastrophic consequences especially when dealing with safety-
critical systems. To enable system designers to develop such complex systems 
consisting of hard- and software and to consider human factors, an appropriate system 
design approach is required. This system design approach should, on the one hand, 
offer methodologies which enable the integrated consideration of these three system 
components, and, which, on the other hand, supports the dependability of the overall 
system, thus, decreasing the possibility of a sincere system failure.  
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A system design approach which meets these requirements is introduced in the 
following sections theoretically and demonstrated exemplarily on the demonstration 
platform “assistance system for powered wheelchairs”.  
2   Dependability-Centered System Design Considering Software, 
Hardware, and Human Factors 
The dependability-centered system design approach advocated here consists of a 
number of steps, which are thoroughly described in the following.   
2.1   User Needs Assessment 
A user needs assessment is an evaluative study or an experiment that gives answers 
about the condition a system is attended to address (cf. [2]). It may also be used in 
order to compare or prioritize different needs which can be tackled. In order to derive 
these answers, different methodologies are available (for an overview cf. [3, 4]) 
ranging from qualitative research designs such as formative scenario analyses or 
future workshops to quantitative experiments. As thoroughly described in [4] each 
method provides important insights and has its own advantages and disadvantages, 
such that only a multi-method approach [5] allows deriving meaningful and valid 
results. While the quantitative research methods offer a high internal validity, so that a 
found effect can with great certainty be traced back to the experimental manipulation; 
they only have a low external validity, which reflects the poor generalizability of the 
results to other settings, other persons and other timings. This is the case as the 
experiments take place in a restricted laboratory environment [6]. Vice versa, the 
qualitative methods allow generalizing the results; however, the results can only to a 
limited extent be traced back to a manipulation. This is the case as other causes such 
as sample biases cannot be eliminated [6].  
 With regard to the wheelchair application the user needs assessment was 
realized in one study, during which about 15 participants with different types of 
disabilities executed a gardening task (for a more thorough description, see [7]), and 
in an experiment, during which about 20 healthy participants drove through a 
standardized course in a realistic office environment with a given electrically powered 
wheelchair, however, with different control methods (for a more detailed description, 
see [8]). In the above introduced classification, the first study reflects a qualitative 
research method design, as it does not contain any experimental manipulation (all 
participants executed the same tasks with the same tools). In addition, the participants 
were asked to fill in unstructured questionnaires. Hence, the study allows generalizing 
the results. The second data acquisition was an experiment in the classical sense, 
although the experimental manipulation was a within-subject manipulation and not a 
between-subject one. The experimental manipulation, we were interested in, is the 
control mode of the wheelchair. On the one hand the wheelchair could be steered with 
a standard joystick; on the other hand, the wheelchair was controlled with a two-
switch control reflecting a speciality input control device. While a between-subject 
International Workshop on 
the Design of Dependable Critical Systems 
September 15, 2009, Hamburg, Germany 
 
86
experimental variation would have requested us to split our pool of participants and 
let one group execute the course with the joystick control mode; the second group 
would have been asked to use the two-switch control mode. Due to the small number 
of participants, which was available, we asked each participant to drive through the 
course twice – the first time with the joystick control mode, the second time with the 
two-switch control mode. While driving we collected data on the collisions which 
were evoked by the driving behavior of the participants.  
 The results of the study are two-fold: On the one hand, the 
questionnaire/qualitative data indicated that especially people with spasticities have 
troubles operating a standard joystick especially in acute phases. In addition, they 
have troubles interpreting figural information, e.g., a city map. Furthermore, people 
suffering especially from incomplete paralysis have deteriorating abilities which 
requires them to continuously adjust their wheelchair such that they can benefit from 
it in their everyday life. On the other hand, the quantitative data derived from the 
study (for a thorough description of the data analyses, see [9]) shows that the variation 
of the cognitive and fine motor abilities of the participants is quite large and that this 
variation is to a great degree predictive for behavior differences for wheelchair users.  
 The experiments’ results (cf. [10]) demonstrate that individual differences in 
the fine motor abilities of the participants were highly indicative about their 
wheelchair behavior. This refers e.g. to the number of collisions which occurred while 
driving through the realistic office environment, but also to the velocities driven or to 
the number of input commands administered to the technical system at hand.  
 Hence, by applying different research methods for the user needs assessment 
it enables us (1) to actually trace back the found effects to the individual differences 
of the users and (2) to generalize this effects to other samples out of the wheelchair 
population. It is, thus, a thorough basis for deriving the system requirements.   
2.2   System Requirements 
The goal of this step in the dependability-centered system design approach is to derive 
a description of the system, which matches as many as possible of the identified user 
needs. In order to yield these system requirements, the process advocated is based on 
the ISO Norm 13407 and the socio-cognitive engineering approach. More 
specifically, a workshop with the design engineers should be conducted, during which 
the following steps need to be covered:  
- specifying a design concept which does meet the needs of the potential users, 
e.g. by using the design ideas of potential users as an important source of 
inputs for the design concept 
- generating a space of possible system designs, which will make the design 
concept more concrete by working out different ways of design ideas which 
will enable to achieve the set design concept  
- specifying the functional and non-functional aspects of the system (including 
the technical specifications) – the functional and non-functional aspects of 
the system at hand will be worked out for all possible system designs and the 
one chosen, which, from a technical point of view, yields an optimal solution 
to the perceived problem situation of the people in need and their task model  
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- yielding feedback on the functional and non-functional aspects of the 
envisioned system on the basis of qualitative research methods  
In order to derive these system requirements on the example of the assistance 
system for electrically powered wheelchairs, the results of the user needs assessment 
were thoroughly presented during a workshop and potential design ideas discussed 
and reviewed. One potential solution was reflected in a wheelchair which offers high 
assistive functionality. If, e.g., global navigation and collision avoidance was 
provided to the wheelchair user, this should have the potential (1) to significantly 
reduce the possibility of the occurrence of safety-critical situations, as it reduces the 
impact of the user’s input on the wheelchair behavior, and (2) to improve the 
disadvantages of today’s wheelchair control when applying speciality input devices 
(e.g., reduce the number of input commands, reduce the time required to reach a goal 
position, optimize the distances to reach an object, etc.). This design idea was then 
presented to stakeholders. While the actual users liked the idea of a highly 
autonomous wheelchair, critics came from nurses and physicians, who feared skill 
degradation. Due to these issues, a nearly autonomous wheelchair as a potential 
design solution was rejected and another design worked out, which has actually 
reached positive feedback from all stakeholders and which is described in the 
following:  
 Due to the great variability of abilities within and between potential users 
and their severe impact on the occurrence of safety-critical situations and human 
performance differences, an assistance system for electrically powered wheelchairs 
should first of all offer different levels of autonomy, which provide different levels of 
assistive functionality to the user. Second, these levels of autonomy should 
automatically be adaptive to the current ability level of its user (cf. [10]). The 
automatic adaptation is crucial to offer as much support as necessary in this moment, 
but not as much support as possible. In addition and especially due to the  problems 
related to the interpretation of figural information for some users with specific 
disabilities, not only the level of autonomy should be adaptive, but also the content 
representation on the interface. Besides these functional requirements, non-functional 
requirements with regard to the dependability and the maintainability of the overall 
human-technology system were set.  
2.3   Use Cases 
In order to guarantee the common understanding of the envisioned system, use cases 
need to be worked out in a next step, which describe how a typical user might use the 
system at hand (cf. [11]).  
 On the example of the assistance system for electrically powered 
wheelchairs, the following use case has been worked out:  
 A wheelchair user with spastics, which are currently on a low level, uses the 
- in the previous section - described adaptive assistance system. After the first 
interactions with the system, the assistance system knows about the user’s current 
good ability level and activates the low assistance functionality mode. This low 
assistance functionality mode uses a collision avoidance behavior on the basis of 
ultrasonic sensors and prevents the wheelchair from colliding with objects  in the 
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environment. No additional assistive functionality will be given to the user. Due to the 
ongoing human-system interaction and communication, the technical system is 
capable of recognizing changes in the current ability level of its user, for example, 
due to the confrontation with a stressful situation. If this is the case, the system 
changes its mode and activates an autonomous navigation mode, which does not only 
prevent the wheelchair from colliding with moving and stable, positive and negative 
obstacles, but also drives the user autonomously to a – from him/her – desired goal 
position. In order to enter such a desired goal position, a touchscreen is mounted on 
the wheelchair, which offers different content representations. While, it could display 
a floor map of the apartment and request from the user to click on the position, he/she 
would like to be driven to; it could also in a first step display a list of rooms available 
in the apartment and if one room has been selected, a list of objects as goal positions 
could pop up, from which the correct one needs to be chosen by the user. Depending 
on the automatic assessment of the user’s current abilities (cf. [12, 13]), which also 
underlies the activation of the assistive functionality mode, the system could define 
the content representation which can without great cognitive effort be interpreted by 
the user, such that the possibility of a wrong entry is reduced.  
 Hence, such and more detailed descriptions of how the system will be used 
from a broad range of users allows the engineers to reduce misunderstandings of the 
system requirements and offers a deep understanding of the system to be developed, 
being, thus, an important basis for the following system design step.  
2.4   System Design 
In order to actually realize the system as envisioned, a system design approach 
needs to be worked out. In order to support this step, it is recommended to use the 
component-based design process KobrA [14] and to enhance the process with 
methods for system architecture design [15, 16] and dependability assurance methods. 
This developed design process provides methods to define functional and non-
functional properties, top-down design and bottom-up integration of features as well 
as methods for testing and assessing the system during run time (online monitoring). 
Because human-technology-interaction is more and more one of the most critical 
factors for designing dependable systems with human involvement, a special focus 
has been placed on specifying the interfaces between humans and technical systems. 
As statistics (cf. [17, 18]) demonstrate, in 1960 only about 20% of system failures 
could be attributed to the so-called human factor, this percentage has risen up to 90% 
in the 1990s.  
The component based design method KobrA2.0 has been utilized during the 
wheelchair development process. The design method is based on orthogonal views of 
the system and components and on a strict separation of specification and realization. 
KobraA2.0 promotes stepwise component decomposition at different abstraction 
levels, components view levels, and components decomposition levels. It includes 
both "top-down" elements and "bottom-up" approaches, which are suitable for an 
efficient prototypal system realization. The generic design method is compatible with 
the developed system architectural concepts as well as with all relevant component 
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types. The possibility to define a quality level and built-in tests during the design 
process is an essential part of the seamless design method. 
The Recursive Nested Behaviour-based Control (RNBC) Structure [15], possesses 
properties necessary for building a complex yet dependable system. The fixed 
structure and the hierarchical nesting of the behavioural levels (the lower, less 
complex behaviours are embedded within the higher, more sophisticated behaviours) 
ensure the stability and predictability of the system’s behaviour. Due to the fact that 
interactions only take place between neighbouring levels (recursiveness), the 
communication effort is moderate and well-defined interfaces ease the 
implementation of different levels by co-operating work groups. Because of the 
recursive extensibility, prototypes built bottom-up are operational through-out all 
development stages.  
The development process starts with the identification of the fundamental 
behaviours, i.e axis-level control, robot-level control, collision avoidance, local 
navigation, and global navigation. The behaviours are sorted according to the required 
dynamics starting from the slowest behaviour on the top of the structure.  
In the next step, the behaviours will be connected according to the required input 
and output signals within one level building one unique interface to neighboured 
levels. The behavioural levels will be connected recursively corresponding to Fig. 1 
building the overall system structure of the wheelchair. Additional to the functional 
interfaces the behavioural levels provide interfaces for system monitoring and 
reconfiguration. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Control system of the assisted electrically powered wheelchair 
This overall system structure, can be utilized further on in the KobrA2.0 
component specification process, while the behavioural levels are related to the 
system decomposition phases (in each phase one new level is tackled) and the 
behaviours within one level are related to the component decomposition (each 
behaviour states one basic component, which may be separated into functional 
components at the bottom of the decomposition process).   
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2.5   System Implementation 
Since the assistance wheelchair is based on a commercial electrically powered 
wheelchair (OttoBock Healthcare GmbH), the mechanical setup, and some further 
components and behaviours are predefined, e.g. the axis-level velocity control 
behaviour. This must be considered in the definition of interfaces, the realization of 
upper level behaviours and the integration of components. 
The overall system structure must also be reflected by the sensor configuration on 
the corresponding behavioural level. The velocity measurement is enhanced by 
incremental encoders on the wheel axes and by a gyro measuring the angular rate of 
the wheelchair orientation. The ultrasonic sensors are arranged around the wheelchair 
in order to detect a broad class of possible obstacles. However, for geometrical and 
physical reasons not all kinds of obstacles can be detected by ultrasonic sensors, e.g. 
holes in the floor or stairs. In order to avoid critical situation during backward driving 
additional infrared sensors are mounted on the rear side of the wheelchair, which are 
able to detect descending stairs.  
According to the system architecture (Fig. 1) the behavioural levels and the 
corresponding components can be realized separately, which is described in the 
following.  
 
Axis-level velocity control 
The axis-level velocity control is a pre-fabricated component, which is integrated 
in a separate control system. It consists of a cascaded control structure for motor 
current control, velocity estimator and a feedback velocity control for the single 
driven wheels. In the basic system the input signal originates from the joystick output. 
The joystick provides the reference velocity vector (magnitude, angular rate), which is 
transformed into axis-level references using the inverse kinematics of the wheelchair. 
Depending on the selected mode, the joystick signal is modified by upper level 
behaviours.  
 
Robot-level velocity control 
The robot-level velocity control uses the reference velocity from the upper level 
and the velocity sensor signals (encoder and gyro) to calculate the velocity error. This 
error is compensated by a proportional integrating (PI) controller. Since the velocity 
measurement is error sensitive against bias drift, slippage and mechanical errors both 
sensor values are fused, in order to combine the advantages of both sensors.  
 
Collision Avoidance / local navigation 
A reflexive collision avoidance behaviour is realized based on the artificial 
potential field method [19]. This method enables a fast reaction on moving obstacles 
without knowing the exact position of the objects. The original algorithm which 
determines concentric virtual forces Fi has been enhanced by a momentum vector 
Mrot, which reflects the asymmetry of the wheelchair in relation to the centre of 
rotation (see Fig. 2.). According to the resulting forces and momentum the velocity 
reference coming from the upper level is modified and forwarded to the velocity 
control level in order to ensure a safe navigation.  
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Local navigation 
The local navigation behaviour ensures, that the wheelchair is able to reach way 
points or goal positions using a fuzzy control structure. The reference positions are 
provided by the path planning behaviour. Since no global positioning is available for 
indoor navigation the position control uses the fused sensor signals from the wheel 
encoders, the odometry and a dead reckoning algorithm in order to calculate the 
actual position. The actual position may be updated if absoluteposition is provided by 
an additional sensor. 
 
Global navigation 
The global navigation behaviour is based on the A* path planning algorithm, 
which calculates the shortest way between a staring point and a goal point for a given 
topological-metric map of the environment.  
M rot
F
1
2
F
a1
a 2
 
Fig. 2: Ultrasonic sensor configuration (small black and grey boxes), 
virtual forces and momentum calculated by the collision avoidance 
algorithm. 
 
User command interface 
The user command interface consists of a touchscreen and a conventional 
wheelchair joystick, which is adapted from the original wheelchair, i.e. the wheelchair 
driver can use the wheelchair in the non-assisted mode, without any drawbacks. 
Switching on the assisting system, the user is currently requested to input the mode, in 
which the wheelchair will operate. In the assisted mode the user is supported by the 
collision avoidance behaviour and the lower levels. In the full autonomous mode the 
user selects the goal position from a set of pre-defined goals using the touch panel. In 
a planned extension the automatic recognition of user capabilities and selection of the 
suited mode will be implemented into the user command interface.  
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2.6   System Integration and Test 
In order to integrate all behaviours described above in a dependable way, a suitable 
hardware and software system has been setup. Due to the behavioural levels a 
separation of functionality and a distribution over many components is possible. For 
the specific system an industrial control PC running the realtime operating system 
QNX has been selected. The PC is equipped with interface cards for CAN, Ethernet, 
WLAN, and I²C communication as well as with arbitrary digital and analog channels. 
The behaviours are integrated as software components which are executed in form of 
separated processes within the realtime system (Fig. 3. shows lowest three levels).  
The behavioural components communicate with each other using interface threads. 
This ensures the realtime communication without data blocking or collision. The 
sensor hardware is connected over special drivers. While the behaviours are 
encapsulated the interfaces are freely accessible form outside. This can be used for a 
local online-monitoring and reconfiguration process, which is implemented in the 
next higher behaviour level. The advantages arising from the separation of behaviours 
has also been used during the functional test of software components.   
 
 
Fig. 3: Software implementation of the wheelchair assistance system. 
Thus, the implementation maintains all aspects of the generic system architecture:  
- the implementation is flexible due to the free choice of methods and 
components for the implementation of single behaviours 
- the structure is extensible enabling the adding or removal of behaviours 
- the signals from and to the layers can be observed locally in order to reduce 
the development effort due to sparse modelling and communication effort in 
the running system 
- the behavioural levels can be developed and tested separately, ensuring high 
maintainability 
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- the user interface is distributed (touch panel for higher levels, joystick on the 
velocity level) ensuring the input of appropriate signals on the corresponding 
behavioural level 
2.7   System Evaluation 
In a last step, the resulting system needs to be evaluated. More specifically, it is to be 
tested whether the needs, which the system should at least partially reduce, has been 
met with the system at hand. A systematic approach for an evaluation is provided e.g. 
by [2] and uses a variety of research methodologies (cf. [6]). In parallel to the 
procedure described for the user needs assessment is it desirable to combine different 
methods to yield a greater validity of the results.  
With regard to a quantitative evaluation, an experimental set-up can be taken, 
during which the participants are grouped on the basis of random numbers to avoid 
systematic selection effects. While a control group executes standardized tasks with a 
standard wheelchair, an experimental group should perform the same tasks with the 
new assistance system for powered wheelchair control. During this experiment, a set 
of variables of interest should be measured, which reflect appropriate 
operationalizations of the needs.  
With regard to a qualitative evaluation, the user’s opinions on the new system in 
comparison to the standard off-the-shelf system can be assessed for example with 
appropriate available questionnaires or with especially for these purposes constructed 
questionnaires (cf. [4]). 
Due to the great sample size, which is required to yield a high power of the results 
for these types of evaluations (cf. [20]), we did not use such a between-subject 
manipulation but a within-subject evaluation. This means, each participant was tested 
twice – once with the standard system and once with the new assistance system for 
powered wheelchair control. Such an evaluation procedure has the advantage that the 
variance, which can be contributed to the subject itself, can be controlled by applying 
a repeated measurement statistical analysis (cf. [21]).  
Such a procedure has been conducted with regard to the wheelchair application and 
more specifically for evaluating the autonomous navigation behavior. For this 
purpose, about 20 participants drove through a standardized course twice, once with a 
two-switch control, once with an autonomous navigation behavior activated. While 
measuring quantifiable data such as the distances driven and the times required 
reaching a specific position, a usability questionnaire has been applied in addition in 
order to gather data on how the participants liked an autonomously driving assistance 
system. Especially the data on the usability questionnaire demonstrate the superiority 
of the autonomous navigation mode: nearly in all aspects (i.e. in easiness to learn, 
intuitiveness, safety, and comfort) the autonomous navigation mode outperformed the 
manual driving mode.  
While this reflects an evaluation of one part of the system, i.e., the autonomous 
navigation mode, a study evaluating the overall system, which adapts its functionality 
to the user’s abilities, will be conducted in the near future. Such an evaluation will 
then also give important feedback on this dependability-centered system design 
approach.  
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3   Conclusion 
This paper aimed at introducing a design approach for dependable complex 
computing systems considering hardware, software, and human factors. For this 
purpose, research design methods from the psychological field of formative and 
summative evaluation (required for the user needs assessment and the final 
evaluations) has been combined with software tools (e.g., development of use cases, 
modeling of software components) and implemented in a traditional system design 
approach covering the development of a system architecture, implementation, 
integration, and test. On this basis a set of design steps have been introduced which 
start with a user needs assessment, during which qualitative and quantitative methods 
are applied in order to identify a need, which the future system should reduce and a 
system requirement analysis, which defines the functional and non-functional 
properties of the computing system. On that basis, use cases were developed, which 
reflect the prototypical usage of the system at hand and which aim at clarifying the 
chosen design solution. With such a clear vision in mind, a system architecture and 
control structure can be developed, which is the starting point for the system 
development. After having implemented and integrated the system, a thorough test 
phase will ensure that the system meets its specifications. If this phase can be 
completed successfully, the proposed system development process finishes with a 
summative evaluation analyzing whether the system is actually capable of reducing 
the - in the user needs assessment - identified needs. In order to clarify these different 
steps, an example of an assistance system for electrically powered wheelchairs has 
been chosen and the results of each of these steps has been summarized in this paper – 
demonstrating the potentials the proposed dependability-centered system design 
approach has especially on reducing the possibility of a failure of the human-
automation system.  
Future work will aim at completing the implementation of the overall system and 
at evaluating its final version as described in Section 2.7. During this final evaluation 
a special emphasis will be put on deriving benchmarks, which will enable a fair 
comparison with other system design approaches especially with regard to 
dependability. For this purpose, the number of accidents which occurred when using 
the system in the long run could be compared with the number of accidents when 
using a system which development was based on another design approach. Other 
factors which are also indicators about the success of the dependability-centered 
system design approach can be considered as well. Hence, the evaluation will not only 
enable judging on the resulting wheelchair system, but also at rating the proposed 
system design approach and at demonstrating the potential benefits of a design 
approach considering all aspects of a complex human-technology system consisting 
of not only hardware, software or human factors, but the interaction of these system 
components.  
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This poster illustrates new methodologies for the design and the realization of 
dependable component-based systems covering hardware, software and human factor 
aspects. The system structure uses the approach of the “Recursive Nested Behavior 
Control” (RNBC) ensuring dependable operation and seamless interaction of the 
system’s components [1]. For the design and the specification of the system the 
component based design Method KobrA [2] is applied. The specification of hardware 
components based on high-level hardware design, Transaction-Level Model [3], is 
presented. Dependability relevant concepts such as Quality of Service and built-in 
tests using test- sheets [4] as a new way of defining the expected functionality of a 
component are introduced. For the on-line monitoring of the system we propose a 
particle Petri net model. This model allows the estimation of the hybrid state of the 
system and the detection of discrepancies between the expected nominal behavior of 
the system and the observed one. For a better reflexion of the reality we model both 
discrete and continuous state of the behaviour. An integrated dependability model has 
been developed which includes system, hardware, software, and human properties on 
a behavioural view. It defines, how much the system’s behaviour deviates from the 
desired behaviour over the system’s mission (usage) and how much the system’s 
behaviour keeps away from the non-desired (critical) behaviour. A literature review 
has shown that quantitative descriptions of system dependability are generally done 
over combinations of some attributes [5], [6]. These attributes are: reliability, 
availability, safety, integrity, confidentiality and maintainability. We introduce a 
behaviour based modelling approach [7], [8], [9]. A dependability metric was 
developed, which can be used during design respectively during run-time to 
measure the sub-systems’ as well as the overall system’s dependability. To be 
able to measure the involved dependability attributes during run-time built-in test 
software modules have been generated based on test-sheets.  
Approaches for the design of Human-Technology Interaction adapt the technical 
system to the operator only in a very general way and ignore differences between 
operators. We adapt the technical system and its interface to the abilities of the 
operator and take into account the individual differences in these abilities between 
and within operators [10]. The interfaces are adapted so that its demand character 
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does not exceed the ability level of the operator. While for some operators it is easier 
to interpret figural information, figural information will be displayed. Others prefer 
verbal and numerical information, so that for them, the relevant contents are displayed 
in the numerical and verbal representation. 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed methods and techniques  
(system architecture, dependability modeling and measure, component-based software 
and hardware design, testing using test sheets, monitoring, human-technology 
interaction etc.) we use a simple case study from the control engineering domain: 
Heating Control System (HCS), which is responsible for maintaining a comfortable 
temperature in a house by regulating the temperature of the available radiators. Using 
this case study, in which scientist from different disciplines and application domains 
were involved, the developed methods were tested and adapted. The achieved 
interesting results show the feasibility of the proposed methods and their usability for 
the design and the realization of dependable systems. 
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